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3As the World Drug Report 2017 clearly shows, there 
is much work to be done to confront the many 
harms inflicted by drugs, to health, development, 
peace and security, in all regions of the world.
Globally, there are an estimated minimum of 
190,000 — in most cases avoidable — premature 
deaths from drugs, the majority attributable to the 
use of opioids.
The terrible impact of drug use on health can also 
be seen in related cases of HIV, hepatitis and 
tuberculosis. 
Much more needs to be done to ensure affordable 
access to effective scientific evidence-based preven-
tion, treatment and care for the people who 
desperately need them, including those in prison 
settings. As just one example, this year’s report high-
lights the need to accelerate accessibility to the 
treatment of hepatitis C, a disease whose negative 
health impact on people who use drugs is far greater 
than that of HIV/AIDS.   
Recent attention has focused on the threats posed 
by methamphetamine and new psychoactive sub-
stances (NPS). However, as the report shows, the 
manufacture of both cocaine and opioids is increas-
ing. These drugs remain serious concerns, and the 
opioid crisis shows little sign of stopping.
The World Drug Report 2017 further looks at the 
links with other forms of organized crime, illicit 
financial flows, corruption and terrorism. It draws 
on the best available evidence and, most of all, high-
lights the fact that much more research needs to be 
carried out in these areas. 
Corruption is the great enabler of organized crime, 
and opportunities for corruption exist at every stage 
of the drug supply chain. However, too little is 
known about how different types of corruption 
interact with drug markets. 
The outcome document of the special session of the 
General Assembly on the world drug problem and 
I am proud to say that this year we are marking 20 
years of the World Drug Report.
Over the past two decades, the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been 
at the forefront of global research into complex areas 
of drug use and supply, supporting international 
cooperation and informing policy choices with the 
latest estimates, information on trends and 
analysis.
This year we are launching a new format, with the 
report available as five separate booklets: the execu-
tive summary, together with the report’s conclusions 
and policy implications; a global overview of drug 
use and supply; a market analysis of plant-based 
drugs; a market analysis of synthetic drugs; and a 
thematic booklet on the links between drugs and 
organized crime, illicit financial flows, corruption 
and terrorism. We have done this in response to 
readers’ needs and to improve user-friendliness, 
while maintaining the rigorous standards expected 
from the Office’s flagship publication. 
The 2017 report comes at a time when the interna-
tional community has acted decisively to achieve 
consensus on a way forward for joint action.
The outcome document unanimously adopted at 
last year’s special session of the General Assembly 
on the world drug problem contains more than 100 
concrete recommendations for implementing bal-
anced, comprehensive and integrated approaches to 
effectively addressing and countering the world drug 
problem. 
Moreover, at its sixtieth session, in March 2017,  the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs adopted resolution 
60/1, reinforcing commitment to implementing the 
outcome document and charting a course to the 
2019 target date of the 2009 Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action on the world drug problem, as 
well as strengthening action towards the Plan of 
Action’s agreed goals and targets. 
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As the special session of the General Assembly and 
the recent session of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs have shown, the international community is 
equipped to respond swiftly and decisively to global 
drug-related challenges. 
For example, in March, the Commission scheduled 
two precursors and an analogue to the scheduled 
drug fentanyl. This important step will make it 
harder for criminals to illicitly manufacture fentanyl 
and its analogues and, I hope, can help to stem the 
tragic increase in opioid overdoses in recent years. 
However, there remains an enormous need for 
capacity-building and technical assistance, and fund-
ing continues to fall far short of political 
commitment. Further resources are urgently needed 
to help all Member States implement the recom-
mendations contained in the outcome document 
of the special session of the General Assembly and 
achieve related targets under the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals.
The many evolving drug challenges also highlight 
the importance of prevention — science- and rights-
based drug use prevention — but also prevention 
of crime, corruption, terrorism and violent extrem-
ism, in line with commitments under the 
conventions and United Nations standards and 
norms. 
Finally, I ask all Governments to help us improve 
the evidence base for these reports. Areas such as 
the links between drugs, terrorism and insurgency 
clearly touch upon sensitive intelligence, and there 
are legitimate concerns about compromising sources, 
collection and operations. But if we want to effec-
tively address drug challenges we need to strengthen 
international cooperation and information-sharing 
to the extent possible, to close the gaps and ensure 
that joint action is targeted, effective and timely. 
Yury Fedotov
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Security Council resolutions express concern about 
terrorist groups profiting from drug trafficking, 
among other forms of transnational organized crime.
It is well established that there are terrorists and 
non-State armed groups profiting from the drug 
trade — by some estimates, up to 85 per cent of 
opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is in terri-
tory under influence of the Taliban. 
However, evidence on the organized crime-terrorism 
nexus remains patchy at best. Moreover, these links 
are not static. Relations between organized crime 
and terrorists groups are always evolving, much like 
drug markets themselves.
As we have seen with the NPS market, drug use, 
supply, trafficking routes and the substances them-
selves continue to shift and diversify at alarming 
speed. 
Drugs continue to represent a major source of rev-
enue for organized crime networks, but business 
models are changing, with criminals exploiting new 
technologies, such as the darknet, that are altering 
the nature of the illicit drug trade and the types of 
players involved, with looser, horizontal networks 
and smaller groups becoming more significant. New 
ways of delivering drugs further point to the need 
to involve other sectors such as postal services in the 
fight against drug trafficking.   
Clearly, countries must be able to act and react to 
an ever-changing and formidable array of threats 
and problems. UNODC is fully engaged in strength-
ening responses, working closely with our United 
Nations partners and in line with the international 
drug control conventions, human rights instruments 
and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
which are themselves complementary and mutually 
reinforcing.
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7The boundaries and names shown and the designa-
tions used on maps do not imply official endorsement 
or acceptance by the United Nations. A dotted line 
represents approximately the line of control in 
Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Paki-
stan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Disputed 
boundaries (China/India) are represented by cross-
hatch owing to the difficulty of showing sufficient 
detail. 
The designations employed and the presentation of 
the material in the World Drug Report do not imply 
the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the 
part of the Secretariat of the United Nations con-
cerning the legal status of any country, territory, city 
or area, or of its authorities or concerning the delimi-
tation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Countries and areas are referred to by the names 
that were in official use at the time the relevant data 
were collected.
All references to Kosovo in the World Drug Report, 
if any, should be understood to be in compliance 
with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
Since there is some scientific and legal ambiguity 
about the distinctions between “drug use”, “drug 
misuse” and “drug abuse”, the neutral terms “drug 
use” and “drug consumption” are used in the World 
Drug Report.
All uses of the word “drug” in the World Drug Report 
refer to substances under the control of the inter-
national drug control conventions.
All analysis contained in the World Drug Report is 
based on the official data submitted by Member 
States to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime through the annual report questionnaire 
unless indicated otherwise.
The data on population used in the World Drug 
Report are taken from: United Nations, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 
World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 
References to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, 
unless otherwise stated.
References to tons are to metric tons, unless other-
wise stated. R stands for the correlation coefficient, 
used as measure of the strength of a statistical rela-
tionship between two or more variables, ranging 
from 0 to 1 in case of a positive correlation or from 
0 to -1 in case of a negative correlation. 
EXPLANATORY NOTES 
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Organized crime groups branch out
Organized crime groups have widened their port-
folio of illicit activities. New crime areas such as 
cybercrime and environmental crime have emerged. 
Fewer groups are exclusively dedicated to drug traf-
ficking, while more are also operating in other illicit 
sectors.
Almost two thirds of drug trafficking groups oper-
ating in countries in the European Union are 
involved in more than one crime area, according to 
research by the European Police Office (Europol), 
and that figure has been rising for years. Drug traf-
ficking groups in Europe are frequently also involved 
in the counterfeiting of goods, trafficking in human 
beings, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in 
weapons. 
Continued importance of drugs to  
organized crime groups
In 2014, transnational organized crime groups across 
the globe were estimated to have generated between 
approximately one fifth and one third of their 
revenues from drug sales. 
Europol identified some 5,000 international organ-
ized crime groups operating in countries of the 
European Union in 2017, and estimated that more 
than one third were involved in drug trafficking. 
This makes drug trafficking more widespread across 
organized crime than organized property crime, 
smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, 
excise fraud or any other illicit activity.
Drug trafficking no longer the preserve  
of large criminal groups
Groups with a strong hierarchical structure, such as 
those in Mexico and Japan, and to some extent in 
the Russian Federation, continue to be involved in 
the drug trade. Hierarchical, top-down organiza-
tions are still the most widespread type of organized 
crime group in Europe, according to Europol.
However, there is evidence that looser, horizontal 
networks are becoming increasingly significant. In 
2017, Europol estimated that such networks 
accounted for 30-40 per cent of organized crime 
groups operating in countries in the European 
Union.
Technology’s role in creating relatively 
low-risk drug markets
The mobile communications revolution has offered 
new opportunities to traffickers. They no longer 
need personal contact with clients; instead, low-level 
“runners” can collect cash and dealers can let the 
customer know where to collect their drugs using 
messages sent over encrypted networks.
The darknet allows users to buy drugs with a cryp-
tocurrency, such as bitcoin, and have their purchases 
delivered to them in a concealed manner. Typical 
buyers are recreational users of cannabis, “ecstasy”, 
cocaine, hallucinogens and NPS. They are less likely 
to order heroin or methamphetamine. Although the 
darknet accounts for only a small percentage of drug 
sales, the market has been growing rapidly in recent 
years.
About 30 per cent of cocaine proceeds  
contributes to illicit financial flows
About 30 per cent of the proceeds of cocaine sales 
at the global level was laundered abroad in 2009, 
according to a model developed by UNODC. A 
2016 study based on interviews with drug crime 
convicts in Italy came to a similar conclusion, sug-
gesting that roughly one third of the money spent 
by cocaine users was being laundered across 
borders.
Drug money can make countries poorer
In the short term, an inflow of drug money can 
boost investment and local gross domestic product. 
But the long-term effects tend to be negative, par-
ticularly when drug-related proceeds comprise a 
sizeable portion of the total economy of a commu-
nity or a country. In this scenario, drug money has 
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the potential to inflate property prices, distort export 
figures, create unfair competition, reinforce skewed 
income and wealth distributions and increase cor-
ruption. In the process, legitimate businesses, 
without access to illicit funds, may be squeezed out 
of the market and new legitimate investments may 
not take place. 
The rise of an illicit economy helps to weaken the 
rule of law and facilitates corruption, which in turn 
reinforces the illicit drug sector. 
Studies suggest that an injection of laundered 
money, including from illicit drug activities, is asso-
ciated with reductions in overall annual economic 
growth rates, particularly in smaller and less devel-
oped countries. One estimate, based on a study of 
17 countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, suggests that a $1 
billion increase in money-laundering could reduce 
overall economic growth by between 0.03 and 0.06 
percentage points.
Corruption exists all along the drug  
supply chain
At each stage of the drug supply chain, there are 
opportunities for corruption. At the production 
level, farmers may bribe eradication teams, produc-
ers may bribe judges and police officers, and 
manufacturers may exploit workers in chemical 
companies in order to get hold of precursor chemi-
cals. Further down the chain, traffickers bribe 
customs officials and take advantage of weaknesses 
in transport firms. At the consumer level, users can 
get drugs through corrupt doctors and 
pharmacists.
Corruption, the illicit drug trade and  
poverty reinforce each other
Corruption entrenches poverty by discouraging for-
eign investment, according to World Bank research. 
In a narco-economy, this is doubly true. Foreign 
firms, seeing the corrupted justice system and per-
vasive money-laundering that characterize 
narco-economies, are unlikely to make or increase 
investments.
Corruption also increases the level of income ine-
quality, according to International Monetary Fund 
research. Higher levels of income inequality are 
known to encourage drug trafficking and 
corruption. In fact, the drug industry may perpetu-
ate and exacerbate income inequality, which may 
in turn cause the expansion of drug production and 
trafficking.
Lack of understanding of the relationship 
between drugs and corruption 
Many studies have focused on specific events or 
geographical areas; others have relied on perceptions 
of corruption. While these approaches have certain 
strengths, they highlight a paucity of data on the 
links between drugs and corruption across countries. 
For example, while, intuitively, such a correlation 
is anticipated, in terms of research, little is known 
about the way that different types of corruption 
interact with drug markets and political structures; 
the way that corruption and violence coexist also 
needs further investigation. 
United Nations-designated terrorist 
groups: Taliban continues to benefit
The Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade is well 
documented. It has taxed entities involved in illicit 
opiate production, manufacture and trafficking in 
Afghanistan. Further, the Consolidated United 
Nations Security Council Sanctions List contains a 
number of Taliban leaders who are accused of direct 
involvement in drug trafficking.
UNODC estimated that non-State armed groups 
raised about $150 million in 2016 from the Afghan 
illicit opiate trade in the form of taxes on the culti-
vation of opium poppy and trafficking in opiates. 
The overall drug-related income, however, may be 
higher still. The Security Council Committee estab-
lished pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) estimated 
the overall annual income of the Taliban at about 
$400 million, half of which is likely to be derived 
from the illicit narcotics economy.
Role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia in the drug trade
The involvement of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the drug trade in 
Colombia goes back decades. At various times, they 
have provided security for coca crops, taxed the 
introduction of precursor chemicals and the use of 
landing strips, sold coca paste and become involved 
in the intraregional cocaine trade. 
11
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Huge variation in estimates of finances  
of terrorist, insurgent and other non-State 
armed groups 
Little reliable data exist for estimating the overall 
wealth of terrorist, insurgent and other non-State 
armed groups, making it tricky to estimate the 
importance of the drug trade. Forbes International 
attempted to compile a list, but the income of the 
wealthiest 10 groups (around $5 billion together) 
was highly skewed, ranging from $25 million to $2 
billion per group.
Limited evidence on drugs, terrorism and 
insurgency 
Much of the work in this area tracks a small number 
of groups, or builds on sources with an interest in 
emphasizing or diminishing certain links. Most 
information on terrorism is collected by intelligence 
agencies and is classified, meaning that researchers 
have to rely on media reports and studies issued by 
non-governmental organizations and think tanks.
FARC agreed in 2016 to halt its involvement in the 
drug business after the peace agreement signed with 
the Government.
Evidence implicating other groups is thin 
Media reports and some evidence from official 
sources link a number of other terrorist, insurgent 
and non-State armed groups to the drug trade. For 
example, media reports claim that Islamic State in 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other armed groups 
in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic produce and 
consume “captagon” tablets — typically ampheta-
mine mixed with caffeine. The group operates in 
an area likely to be a manufacturing hub, according 
to seizure data, but no conclusive evidence has 
emerged so far, as other groups also operate in the 
same area.
Boko Haram has also reportedly helped drug traf-
fickers to smuggle heroin and cocaine across West 
Africa. During the trial of Boko Haram members 
in Chad, the court of appeal heard that considerable 
quantities of psychotropic substances had been 
recovered and that Boko Haram members were regu-
larly involved in the trafficking in and consumption 
of those substances. Further north, some evidence 
suggests that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has 
been involved in cannabis and cocaine trafficking, 
or at least in protecting traffickers, but that its over-
all income from the drug sector appears to have 
been rather modest.
Income from drugs key for some terrorist, 
insurgent and non-State armed groups
Much depends on the location of a particular group. 
Some have benefited from being based in areas 
where drug crops flourish. Groups that aspire to 
control large amounts of territory need huge finan-
cial resources, and have relied on organized crime 
and the illicit drug trade to fund their ambitions. 
Just one revenue stream of many for most 
groups
Terrorist and other non-State armed groups are 
adept at tapping into multiple sources of revenue. 
If drug profits dry up, the groups may move into 
extortion, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies, 
sale of natural resources or sale of cultural artefacts. 
However, groups aiming simply to stage shocking 
attacks on civilians can do so with negligible finan-
cial investment.
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INTRODUCTION 
Although presented as a stand-alone publication, 
this booklet constitutes the fifth part of the World 
Drug Report 2017. It investigates the connection 
between the drug problem and four areas of inter-
national concern — organized crime, illicit financial 
flows, corruption and terrorism/insurgency. The 
discussion draws on research by UNODC and a 
wide range of outside sources to provide an up-to-
date assessment of these complex relationships. 
The booklet highlights where our knowledge is lack-
ing and provides ideas for areas of further research. 
It begins by sketching out the transformation in 
drug-related organized crime from the dismantling 
of the Colombian cartels in the 1990s, to the use 
of drones, the darknet and the emergence of network 
organizations in recent years. Next, the consequences 
of drug money in the international system are ana-
lysed. The booklet then discusses the ways in which 
the drug trade and corruption reinforce each other. 
Finally, the extent to which groups including the 
Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) have benefited from drug money is dis-
cussed in depth, along with a broader analysis of the 
links between terrorist, insurgent and other non-
State armed groups, violence and the illicit drug 
trade.
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Major transformation of organized 
crime in recent decades 
Organized crime groups seize  
new opportunities 
Organized crime groups have always been resourceful 
in adapting to change. Anything from counterfeiting 
and fraud to kidnapping and trafficking in persons 
has been considered fair game. Probably the most 
visible example of this flexibility is the diversification 
that organized crime went through after the end of 
alcohol prohibition in the United States of America 
in 1933. Criminal groups that had exploited 
prohibition for profit in the 1920s went after new 
“business opportunities” in a wide range of 
potentially lucrative sectors in the 1930s. 
Similarly, after a crackdown on organized crime 
groups in various parts of the world in the 1990s 
(the collapse of the Medellín and Cali cartels in 
Colombia, for example; the arrest of major organ-
ized crime bosses in the United States and Italy, etc.), 
new groups emerged with more diversified portfolios 
that included environmental crime, cybercrime, 
identity theft, the smuggling of migrants and money 
laundering. Many of the present-day activities of 
organized crime groups hardly existed in the early 
1990s. 
In some cases, organized crime groups have been 
able to profit from tighter regulatory systems. When 
a Government legislates to control, for example, 
hazardous waste, organized crime groups can step 
in and provide a cheaper service by circumventing 
these new standards. The same can be said of regu-
latory systems aimed at protecting wildlife, cultural 
heritage or intellectual property. 
In general, the ability of organized crime groups to 
shift between illicit markets is illustrated by the fact 
that many of them already operate in more than one 
sector. In Mexico, for example, several major groups 
run activities spanning multiple business lines.6 
6 Cameron H. Homes, Organized Crime in Mexico (Potomoc 
Books, University of Nebraska Press, 2014); George Philip 
and Suana Berruecos, eds., Mexico’s Struggle for Public Secu-
rity (Springer, June 2012); Jonathan D. Rosen and Roberto 
Zepeda, Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in 
Mexico: The Transition from Felipe Calerdón to Enrique Peña 
Nieto (Lexington Books, July 2016). 
A. THE DRUG PROBLEM AND  
ORGANIZED CRIME
Organized crime groups have existed in various parts 
of the world for centuries,1, 2, 3 and they have been 
involved in the international drug trade for almost 
100 years.4, 5 Over this time, their operations and 
structures have been transformed by technology, 
legislation and shifts in politics; many of the most 
infamous drug trafficking gangs have come and gone. 
The importance of drug trafficking for organized 
crime seems to have reached a peak in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, after which new “business oppor-
tunities” emerged. Many of the current activities of 
organized crime groups hardly existed a few decades 
ago. Nevertheless, drug trafficking can serve as an 
incubator for the development of organized crime 
groups. At other times, it may also be an activity 
that organized crime groups take up after their estab-
lishment in other illicit markets. 
Overall, drugs continue to play an important role 
for organized crime groups, which have found new 
ways to smuggle and sell their produce, hide their 
profits and intimidate their rivals, influence politi-
cians and eliminate their enemies. 
1 Cyrille Fijnaut, “Searching for organized crime in history”, 
The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2014), pp. 53-95. 
2 David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: Japan's Crimi-
nal Underworld (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
2012), pp. 18-21.
3 Jason Sardell, “Economic origins of the mafia and patron-
age system in Sicily”, BSc project, Worcester Polytechnic 
Institute, 13 March 2009.
4 Fijnaut, “Searching for organized crime in history”.
5 Michael Koutouzis and Pascale Perez, Atlas Mondial des 
Drogues, Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues (Paris, 
Presses universitaires de France, 1996).
What is an organized  
crime group?
“A structured group of three or more persons, exist-
ing for a period of time and acting in concert with 
the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences … in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
a financial or other material benefit.” 
United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2000.
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can communicate more rapidly, making them highly 
effective in delivering goods and harder to track 
down.13, 14 When individuals are targeted, the net-
work can quickly regroup around new players,15 
making them extremely resilient.16 The fragmenta-
tion of criminal markets with the emergence of small 
crime groups and even individual criminal entre-
preneurs is especially pronounced in online activities, 
including the trafficking of drugs over the darknet.17 
But drug trafficking is certainly not restricted to a 
single type of criminal group. Strongly hierarchical 
groups18 such as those in Mexico, Japan and to some 
extent the Russian Federation19 continue to be 
involved in the drug trade.
Transformation of organized crime and 
drug markets through technology and 
logistics 
Organized crime groups are locked in fierce com-
petition, not only with the authorities but also with 
their rivals. As is the case for any commercial activ-
ity with a strong field of competitors, crime groups 
wanting to stay ahead need to be first to deploy the 
latest technology.
13 Vy Le, “Organised crime typologies: structure, activities and 
conditions”, Internal Journal of Criminology and Sociology, 
vol. 1 (Lifescience Global, Mississauga, Ontario, 2012), pp. 
121-131. 
14 Frederick Desroches, “Research on upper level drug  
trafficking: a review”, Journal of Drug Issues, vol. 37, No.4 
(October 2007), p.833. 
15 UNODC, Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected 
Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries (September 
2002).
16 Carlo Morselli, Inside criminal networks (2009); Toine Spap-
ens, “Interaction between criminal groups and law enforce-
ment: the case of ecstasy in the Netherlands” Global crime, 
vol. 12, No. 1 (2011), pp. 19-40; Paul A. C. Duijn, Victor 
Kashirin and Peter. M. A. Sloot, “The Relative Ineffective-
ness of Criminal Network Disruption”, Scientific Reports, 4, 
4238 (2014), p.1. 
17 SOCTA 2017.
18 Le, “Organised crime typologies: structure, activities and 
conditions”. 
19 In the case of Russian organized crime groups the organiza-
tional structure is hierarchical though rather decentralized 
as groups are often composed of separate quasi-autonomous 
“brigades” operating more or less independently from each 
other even though they tend to pool their resources (Fred-
erico Varese, professor of criminology at the University of 
Oxford, quoted in “Fortune 5: The biggest organized crime 
groups in the world”, Fortune (September 14, 2014). Avail-
able at http://fortune.com/2014/09/14/biggest-organized-
crime-groups-in-the-world/). 
In recent years, diversification among criminal 
groups, including drug traffickers, has increased 
rapidly. In 2013, the European Police Office 
(Europol) estimated that over 30 per cent of the 
organized crime groups operating in the European 
Union were involved in more than one crime area; 
the proportion was over 50 per cent for drug traf-
ficking groups. By 2017, the figure had risen to 45 
per cent for all groups and 65 per cent for groups 
involved in drug trafficking. Three quarters of drug 
trafficking groups were involved in trafficking more 
than one type of drug. Crimes frequently linked to 
drug trafficking in Europe include the counterfeit-
ing of goods, trafficking in human beings, smuggling 
of migrants and trafficking in weapons.7, 8
Structural transformation of organized 
crime groups 
Hierarchical structures have a major weakness: they 
can be easily dismantled when detected by the 
authorities. Some hierarchical crime groups have 
reshaped their structures in recent decades to become 
networked organizations. At the same time, smaller 
groups with looser hierarchies have begun to par-
ticipate in international drug trafficking, often using 
new technologies to reduce the risk of detection. 
Although most identified international organized 
crime groups in the European Union remain hier-
archically organized,9 Europol suggests a trend away 
from vertical structures towards horizontal crime 
groups operating along a network organization 
model (cellular structure and less rigid or permanent 
hierarchies).10 Loose criminal networks represented 
30-40 per cent of organized crime groups identified 
by Europol in 2017.11 Although they exist in all 
drug markets, loose criminal networks are particu-
larly present in the trafficking of herbal cannabis 
and synthetic drugs, including new psychoactive 
substances (NPS).12 This type of network is often 
more nimble than other types and their members 
7 Europol, SOCTA 2013: European Union Serious and  
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (The Hague, 2103).
8 Europol, SOCTA 2017: European Union: Serious and  
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (The Hague, 2017).
9 Ibid.
10 SOCTA 2013.
11 SOCTA 2017.
12 Wouter Vanhove and others, Yilcan: Yield of Illicit Indoor 
Cannabis Plantations (Gent, Academia Press, 2012).
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Still a niche market in the global context but with 
strong growth potential, the darknet is an encrypted 
network where users can anonymously exchange 
goods and services, both legal and proscribed. Dark-
net users get drugs posted to them after paying in 
a cryptocurrency such as bitcoin. Its anonymity 
reduces the risk of arrest for both dealers and users, 
and also eliminates other pitfalls associated with 
buying drugs, such as the possibility of falling victim 
to other forms of crime in neighbourhoods where 
drug dealing is rife.26
For the time being, the darknet accounts for only a 
small percentage of drug sales. Typical buyers are 
recreational drug users who mostly purchase can-
nabis, ecstasy, cocaine, various types of hallucinogen 
and NPS. They are less prone to ordering heroin 
and methamphetamine.27 But drug purchases on 
the darknet are growing rapidly in some countries28 
and its more direct process cuts several links out of 
the supply chain.29 A study of so-called “crypto-
markets” concluded that nearly a quarter of their 
overall revenue, both in September 2013 and in 
January 2016, was generated by transactions greater 
than $1,000, suggesting that some purchases are 
intended for offline distribution.30 
While drug trafficking over the darknet is still rela-
tively small in scale and concentrated in developed 
countries, it is fast growing and has the potential to 
significantly reduce the need for the large, staff-
intensive, drug distribution networks that have been 
operating for decades in cities across the globe. If 
this were to happen, the results would be difficult 
to predict. For instance, the current cultivation areas 
of plant-based drugs would be unlikely to change. 
But at the distribution level, street dealers could end 
up in violent competition for their dwindling client 
base, or they may look for alternative ways of making 
26 Cadet-Taïrou and others, “Substances psychoactives, usagers 
et marchés: les tendances récentes”. 
27 Global Drug Survey 2016 and Global Drug Survey 2015. 
Available at www.globaldrugsurvey.com.
28 Ibid. 
29 James Martin. “Lost on the Silk Road: online drug distribu-
tion and the ‘cryptomarket’”. Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, vol. 14, No. 3 (2014), p.362.
30 Kristy Kruithof and others, Internet-facilitated Drugs Trade: 
An Analysis of the Size, Scope and the Role of the Netherlands, 
Research Report Series (Santa Monica, California, Rand 
Corporation, 2016).
Organized crime groups have long focused on speed-
ing up transportation of drugs by using ships, 
containers, aircraft or even by manufacturing their 
own semi-submersible vessels. As a result, they have 
been able to transport ever larger amounts of drugs 
across the globe.20
The mobile communications revolution has offered 
new risk-averse opportunities. Rather than engaging 
in personal contact with clients, drug dealers can 
now use low-level runners to collect cash before let-
ting the customer know by text message where to 
collect their drugs. Even when dealers get caught, 
they are rarely in possession of anything more than 
a small quantity of any particular drug, clearly reduc-
ing their “business risk”.21 Added to this, dealers 
can use encryption software to protect their com-
munications and data — a problem for law 
enforcement authorities that is compounded by the 
growing popularity of native encryption on mobile 
devices.22 As a result, a list of potential clients' tel-
ephone numbers saved on a cell phone or a SIM 
card is now a valuable asset that can even be traded 
among crime groups. 
More recently, reports suggest that drug trafficking 
gangs have been hacking into drone management 
systems used in the United States to police the Mexi-
can border23 and systems used by the port authorities 
in Antwerp to track containers.24 Europol has high-
lighted the emerging phenomenon of criminal 
groups hiring specialist hackers and expects such 
activities to grow in importance.25
20 Damián Zaitch, Trafficking Cocaine: Colombian Drug Entre-
preneurs in the Netherlands, Studies of organized crime, vol. 
1 (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002).
21 Agnés Cadet-Taïrou and others, “Substances psychoactives, 
usagers et marchés: les tendances récentes (2015-2016)”, 
Tendances, vol. 8, No. 115 (December 2016). 
22 Europol, IOACTA 2016: Internet Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment (The Hague, 2016). 
23 “US border patrol drones hacked by drug cartels”,  
3 January 2016. Available at www.hackread.com/us-border-
patrol-drones-hacked-by-drug-cartels/. 
24 “To move drugs, traffickers are hacking shipping contain-
ers”, 21 October 2013. Available at https://motherboard.
vice.com/en_us/article/how-traffickers-hack-shipping-
containers-to-move-drugs. 
25 “Police warning after drug traffickers’ cyber-attack”, 16 Octo-
ber 2013, BBC News. Available at http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-24539417. 
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transit markets, several so-called “big bosses” of 
organized crime in Italy and the United States were 
also arrested during that decade. They had previ-
ously controlled much of the trafficking of drugs in 
their respective countries.36 After these disruptions, 
smaller groups emerged, some of which were spin-
offs from the dismantled groups. Many of them 
continued to rely on the drug trade, even though 
the overall importance of drugs appears to have 
started to decline as organized crime groups discov-
ered new lucrative and less risky business 
opportunities. 
Similarly, the emergence of new organized crime 
groups from the successor States of the former Soviet 
Union and other transition countries in Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s seemed to presage the decline 
in significance of the drug trade for organized crime 
groups. These new groups were never primarily 
focused on drug trafficking.37 However, a UNODC 
study with a global focus suggested that by 2002 
half of the 40 criminal groups operating in the 16 
countries investigated counted illicit drugs as their 
main or core activity.38 
Drugs remain an important market  
for organized crime
Despite the transformations in recent decades and 
a trend towards crime diversification, the drug 
market continues to play a key role in organized 
crime activities. In Europe, illicit drugs not only 
constitute the single largest organized crime 
market,39 but also a market that shows a high degree 
of both collaboration and competition between 
organized crime groups across national, linguistic 
and ethnic divisions.40 
World, The Brookings institution (Washington D.C., 
1996); David Amoruso, “The Golden Triangle: How triads 
cornered the heroin market” (16 June 2016). Available at 
http://gangstersinc.ning.com/profiles/blogs/the-golden-
triangle-how-triads-cornered-the-heroin-market. 
36 Koutouzis and Perez, Atlas Mondial des Drogues.
37 Vadim Volkov, “The Russian mafia; rise and extinction”, 
The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, Letizia Paoli,  
ed. (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 159-176.
38 UNODC, Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected  
Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen Countries  
(September 2002).
39 SOCTA 2013.
40 Mangai Natarajan, Marco Zanella and Christopher Yu, 
“Classifying the variety of drug trafficking organizations”, 
money. While violence in the core drug business 
(the supplier-customer relationship) might be 
reduced with the spread of anonymous drug pur-
chases, it is less clear whether this will ultimately 
result in more or less crime. 
Evolution of links between organized 
crime and drug trafficking 
Most of the increase and involvement of organized 
crime groups in drug trafficking worldwide occurred 
after the Second World War.31 While there were still 
some individuals involved in the illicit drug trade 
in the 1960s and 1970s, groups became dominant 
in the 1980s, when business became increasingly 
cross-border and complex. 
The 1990s witnessed a new phase with the power-
ful Medellín drug cartel collapsing in 1993 and the 
Cali cartel being taken out in 1995, eliminating the 
groups that had controlled much of the international 
cocaine business.32 The fall of the Colombian cartels 
heralded a series of changes in the drug trafficking 
scene during the 1990s, including the emergence 
of smaller groups. They turned out to be efficient 
in trafficking drugs but were less of an immediate 
threat to the State as such.
In Myanmar, the Mong Tai Army had controlled 
much of the production and export of heroin to 
countries in East and South-East Asia,33 prior to 
being dissolved in 1996.34 This disrupted the supply 
chain it had established through Hong Kong, China 
and Taiwan Province of China and on to the 
markets in North America.35 In destination and 
31 David F. Musto, The American Disease – Origins of Narcotic 
Control (Oxford University Press, 1987).
32 Francisco E. Thoumi, Debates y Paradigmas de las Poliíticas 
de Drogas en el Mundo y los Desafíos para Colombia (Bogotá, 
Academia Colombiana de Ciencias Económicas, 2015).
33 United Nations office for Drug Control and Prevention 
(ODCCP), “Main centres of illicit opium production 
– Myanmar” in ODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime, 
Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001, pp. 44-59. 
34 Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, eds., Government 
Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, CISA 
Studies in International Security, in cooperation with the 
Pacific Basin Research Center (London, 1997); Global 
Security.org, Mong Tai Army (MTA). Available at www.
globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/sua.htm; Mong 
Tai Army. Available at www.revolvy.com/main/index.
php?s=Mong%20Tai%20Army. 
35 Koutouzis and Perez, Atlas Mondial des Drogues; Paul B. 
States, Global Habit – The Drug Problem in a Borderless 
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crime groups involved in drug trafficking tend to 
be larger.42
As a consequence of globalization and cross-border 
networking, Europol concluded that non-European 
Union crime groups involved in the drug trade in 
Europe are nowadays made up of citizens from a 
large number of countries; most likely countries in 
Latin America, the former Soviet Union, Afghani-
stan, Pakistan and countries in East Asia and in 
North Africa. Seventy per cent of organized crime 
groups in Europe are composed of members of many 
different nationalities.43
State responses to drug trafficking 
groups
The emergence of powerful and politically influen-
tial cross-border drug trafficking organizations in 
the 1980s prompted national Governments to 
commit to international legal obligations to fight 
such criminal activities. 
One of the key instruments they adopted was the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, 
which specifically warned of “the links between illicit 
traffic and other related organized criminal activities 
42 SOCTA 2013.
43 SOCTA 2013.
Europol identified some 5,000 international organ-
ized crime groups operating in the European Union 
in 2017, over 35 per cent of which were involved 
in drug trafficking — more than in property crime, 
the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human 
beings, excise fraud or any other illicit activity.41 
Compared with organized crime groups operating 
in other crime areas, such as financial and economic 
crime, property crime and counterfeiting, organized 
Journal of Drug Issues (2015), 409-430; François Farcy, 
“Renseignement criminel et lutte contre la criminalité 
organisée en Belgique", Revue Française de Criminologie et de 
Droit Pénal, No. 4, (2015), pp 3-40.
41 SOCTA 2017.
Fig. 1 Importance of organized crime groups, 
European Union
Source: UNODC, adapted from Europol, SOCTA 2017. 
Table 1 Organized crime groups active in illicit drug markets in Europe 
Source: Ernesto U. Savona and Michele Riccardi, eds., From Illegal Markets to Legitimate Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised 
Crime in Europe, Final Report of Project OCP – Organised Crime Portfolio (Trento, Transcrime, Università degli Studi di Trento, 
2015).
smuggling
of migrants
over 35 per cent of
all organized crime 
groups involved
excise 
fraud
drug trafficking
trafficking
in human
beings
organized
property
crime
Importance of organized crime groups, European Union
Strong evidence of involvement of  
organized crime groups from  
specific countries/regions 
Limited evidence of involvement of organized 
crime groups from specific countries/regions 
Heroin Albanian, Balkan, Turkish, African
Bulgarian, Romanian, other eastern European, British, 
Dutch, Italian mafias, other Italian, Lithuanian, motorcycle 
gangs, Middle Eastern, other Asian, North African
Cocaine Colombian, African, Albanian, 
Italian ('Ndrangheta), Spanish
British, Finnish, French, other Italian, motorcycle gangs, 
other western European, Balkan, Bulgarian, Romanian, 
Russian/Georgian, Mexican, North African,  
South American
Cannabis Albanian, Chinese, Dutch,  
North African, other Asian, Spanish
African, Russian/Georgian, Turkish, Italian mafias, British, 
Finnish, French, Irish, motorcycle gangs
Other illicit 
drugs
British, Dutch, Lithuanian, 
other eastern European
British, Finnish, motorcycle gangs, other western  
European, Albanian, Russian/Georgian, Turkish, Chinese, 
other Asian
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Nexus between organized crime and drugs in Germany 
Some 37 per cent of prosecutions against organized crime 
groups in Germany in 2015 were linked to groups involved 
in drug trafficking, according to government data. Europol 
estimated a similar proportion for the European Union as a 
whole (more than 35 per cent in 2017).a 
Estimated at 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2010, overall income 
generated by organized crime in Germany seemed to be below 
the European Union average, estimated at 0.9 per cent.b
The proportion of organized crime groups involved in drug 
trafficking in Germany declined between 2009-2014, though 
it increased again in 2015 as details of prosecutions sug-
gest. In recent years, other crime areas have been growing in 
importance: property crime (from 12 per cent in 2010 to 15 
per cent in 2015), cybercrime (from 0.7 per cent in 2010 to 
4 per cent in 2015) and trafficking in persons and smuggling 
of migrants (from 6 per cent in 2010 to 8 per cent in 2015).c 
While this trend reflects the diversification of activities and 
areas in which organized crime is involved, it may also reflect 
the increasing attention of law enforcement authorities to 
other crime areas.
Distribution of types of organized crime activities 
in Germany (per cent), based on number of legal 
proceedings against organized crime groups, 
2015*
* N = 566 legal proceedings against organized crime groups, of 
which 205 were primarily involved in drug trafficking. The total 
number of suspects among those organized crime groups amounted 
to 8,675 persons in 2015s. 
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), “Organisierte Kriminalität: 
Bundeslagebild, 2015.
Proportion of prosecuted groups involved in  
illicit drugs in overall prosecuted organized crime 
groups, Germany, 2009-2015*
* The total number of prosecutions against organized crime groups 
has remained relatively stable in recent years: 579 in 2009 and 566 
in 2015.
Source: BKA, “Organisierte Kriminalität: Bundeslagebild, 2015".
Proportion of drug offences in all reported  
offences and in all prosecutions related to organ-
ized crime groups, Germany, 2014 and 2015
Source: BKA, “Organisierte Kriminalität, Bundeslagebild 2015“ 
(and 2014); BKA, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik: Bundesrepublick 
Deutschland – Jahrbuch 2015 (and 2014). 
a SOCTA 2017.
b Ernesto U. Savona and Michele Riccardi, eds., From Illegal 
Markets to Legitimate Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised Crime 
in Europe, Final Report of Project OCP – Organised Crime 
Portfolio (Trento, Transcrime, Università degli Studi di Trento, 
2015) p. 36.
c BKA, "Organisierte Kriminalität, Bundeslagebild 2015  
and 2010". Available at www.bka.de.
d BKA, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik: Bundesrepublick Deutschland 
– Jahrbuch 2014, 62nd ed. (Wiesbaden, Kriminalistisches  
Institut, 2014).
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Nonetheless, drug trafficking has continued to be the main 
activity shared by organized crime groups in Germany. The 
importance of illicit drugs in prosecution cases of organized 
crime groups remains far higher (eight times higher in 2015) 
than in overall reported offences.d
Drugs
36.7
Property
crime,
14.8
Economic
crime,
11.8
Tax and 
customs fraud, 
9
Trafficking in 
persons and 
smuggling of 
migrants, 8.1
Violence,  4.9
Cybercrime, 3.9
Counterfeiting, 
2.8
Nightlife-
related crime, 
2.7
Money 
Laundering, 2.1
Environmental 
crime, 0.9
Arms 
trafficking, 0.9
Corruption, 0.4
Other, 0.9
Proportion of 
 all offenc s 
Proportion of proceedings 
related to organized crime 
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money laundering, corruption and obstruction of 
justice. The Convention extended the framework 
for legal assistance, law enforcement cooperation 
and extradition from drug trafficking to all forms 
of organized crime. 
In parallel, efforts increased to deal with the drug 
problem, not only from the supply but also from 
the demand side. The 1998 Political Declaration 
and its Action Plans, the 2009 Political Declaration 
and Plan of Action, as well as the Outcome docu-
ment of the 2016 special session of the United 
Nations General Assembly on the world drug prob-
lem, stressed the importance of demand reduction 
efforts as part of a balanced approach to address the 
drug problem. 
National Governments have also sought to counter 
the technology harnessed by drug trafficking organi-
zations by updating their standards on the acceptance 
of electronic evidence, training their staff in the 
detection and use of this kind of evidence, and intro-
ducing new strategies specifically targeting the use 
of social and electronic media by drug traffickers. 
However, many Governments seem to have started 
shifting their focus from drug control to a broader 
range of criminal activities. The illicit drug trade is 
increasingly seen as one crime typology among the 
many. Budgets have been rising for fighting terror-
ism, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, money 
laundering, corruption and various other forms of 
economic crime. In parallel, international assistance 
for anti-narcotics activities and alternative develop-
ment has declined; remarkable because overall 
development assistance has continued to increase 
since 2009.45 
B. DRUG PROCEEDS AND 
ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS 
Billions of dollars flow through the hands of drug 
trafficking organizations each year, and what they 
do with that money can have a huge impact on local 
and wider economies. They might smuggle cash out 
of their home country, buy or build real estate, invest 
in restaurants and casinos for money laundering 
45 World Drug Report 2016 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.16.XI.7). 
which undermine the legitimate economies and 
threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of 
States”. Governments agreed on a broad range of 
measures to fight drug trafficking, including extra-
dition, confiscation of proceeds, mutual legal 
assistance, precursor control, anti-money laundering 
measures and controlled deliveries. 
The 1988 Convention also stipulated that serious 
offences such as the production, manufacture, trans-
port, sale, importation, exportation of drugs44 
would be extraditable, ending years of impunity and 
curtailing the ability of crime bosses to continue 
their operations from behind the walls of local pris-
ons. In the Americas, this may have prompted 
organized crime groups to adjust their strategies. 
Rather than sending drugs straight to lucrative final 
destinations where extradition treaties were enforced, 
they may have begun to make use of transit coun-
tries from where extradition was less likely, even if 
prices were lower and profits were smaller. This 
changed international drug trafficking flows as well 
as the power structures of organized crime groups. 
Colombian groups, for example, may have given up 
influence, enabling Mexican organized crime groups 
to fill the void and develop into powerful drug car-
tels. The change also may have created new 
opportunities for smaller groups to get involved, 
expanding the chain of drug trafficking in transit 
countries, notably in Central America and later in 
Africa, where drug trafficking groups brought insta-
bility and violence. 
Successes in the fight against drug trafficking, partly 
prompted by improved international cooperation, 
brought rising levels of risk and motivated several 
organized crime groups to look for alternative 
opportunities that would attract less attention from 
authorities. Against this backdrop, a new interna-
tional tool was devised to fight organized crime. In 
2000, the United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organized Crime, also called the Palermo 
Convention, was signed. Signatories agreed to crimi-
nalize participation in organized crime groups, 
44 Covered by article 3, para. 1, of the Convention, this 
includes activities such as production, manufacture, trans-
port, sale, importation, exportation of drugs contrary to 
the 1961 or the 1971 conventions, unlawful distribution of 
precursor chemicals as well as money laundering and related 
activities; not included are offences related to the purchase, 
possession or cultivation of drugs for personal consumption. 
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drugs, it represents the quantity of drugs sold mul-
tiplied by respective retail prices.
Some recent global estimates suggest that the pro-
ceeds of drug sales accounted for slightly more than 
one quarter of overall revenues of transnational 
organized crime groups in 2014, with a maximum 
range from around one fifth to one third of such 
revenues. In recent years, drug-related income seems 
to have represented the second largest source of 
income — after counterfeiting of a broad range of 
goods — of transnational organized crime groups 
at the global level.46 
Drug proceeds in industrialized countries
Drug money was the second largest source of crimi-
nal revenue in the United States, the United 
46 This was based on drug trafficking estimates of $426 to 
$652 billion out of a total transnational organized crime 
income of $1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion in 2014 (Channing 
May, “Transnational crime and the developing world”, 
Global Financial Integrity (Washington D.C., March 2017). 
purposes, or stash their profits in offshore financial 
centres. Depending on the method they choose, 
property prices can be distorted, unfair competition 
created, licit businesses crowded out, corruption 
bolstered and the climate to attract international 
investment spoilt, ultimately eroding rule of law 
and economic stability. 
This section assesses how much money drug-related 
crime generates and describes how trafficking groups 
channel their money into the wider economy, par-
ticularly when they send money abroad, in which 
case it is termed “illicit financial flows”.
Understanding these processes is a vital component 
in the fight against both financial and drug-related 
crime.
Proceeds of drug crime 
Measuring the financial significance of illicit activi-
ties enables the comparison of criminal activities 
across sectors. The term “proceeds” is equivalent to 
“sales”, “turnover” and “revenue”. In the case of 
DRUG PROCEEDS
illicit nancial ows
related to drugs
domestic international =
Gross profit of drugs = drug proceeds − cost of drugs
Profits available for laundering =
Net profit of drugs = gross profit − trafficking costs*
* Transportation costs, intermediaries, bribes, etc.
** Living expenses, luxury goods, cars, etc.
  net profit − living expenses of traffickers** 
Sustainable development goals:  
target 16.4
By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms 
flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen 
assets and combat all forms of organized crime.
The international community is currently developing 
indicators to measure the reduction in illicit financial 
flows, including those related to the illicit drug sector.
What the United Nations says
The proceeds of crime are defined in the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
2000 as well as in the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, 2003 as “any property derived from 
or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commis-
sion of an offence”. 
This was previously described in the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, 1988 as “any property derived 
from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the 
commission of an offence established in accordance 
with article 3, paragraph 1.”
Measurement concepts: from drug proceeds 
to illicit financial flows
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In the European Union, the 2013 drug market is 
valued at approximately 24.3 billion euros a year.48 
According to studies that valued the drug market 
in 2010, as a percentage of economic output, drug 
sales were less important in the European Union 
than in the United States. In 2010, spending on 
drugs amounted to 0.23 per cent (27.7 billion euros) 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
European Union,49 compared with 0.7 per cent 
($109 billion) in the United States.50
48 Range: 21-31 billion euros (European Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), European 
Drug Report, Trends and Developments (Lisbon, 2016)).
49 Savona and Riccardi, eds., From Illegal Markets to Legitimate 
Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe.
50 Beau Kilmer and others, What Americas Users Spend on  
Illegal Drugs: 2000-2010, Research Reports Series, docu-
ment No. RR-534-ONDCP (Santa Monica, California, 
Rand Corporation, 2014).
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Italy, according to estimates 
dating from 2000-2009 compiled by UNODC.47 
All other criminal activity was dwarfed in terms of 
revenue by tax evasion, according to the study, which 
also included data from Australia and Germany. If 
tax evasion is excluded, drugs accounted for between 
one fifth and one quarter of the total proceeds of 
crime in the six countries combined over this period, 
the data suggest. With tax evasion included, drugs 
still account for roughly 10 per cent of the total 
proceeds of crime.
47 UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from 
Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime, 
Research report (October 2011), pp. 70-91.
Table 2 Proceeds of illicit drug sales and other crimes in selected industrialized countries,  
expressed as proportion of gross domestic product 
Sources: UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime, 
Research report (October 2011). Based on: Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, “Chasing Dirty Money – the Fight against Money 
Laundering” (Washington D.C., 2004); ONDCP, What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs (Washington D.C., December 2001); 
Chris Groom and Tom Davies, “Developing a Methodology for Measuring Illegal Activity for the UK National Accounts”, Economic 
Trends, No. 536, July 1998, pp. 33-71; Stephen Pudney, Celia Badillo, Mark Bryan, Jon Burton, Gabriella Conti, Maria lacovou, 
“Estimating the size of the UK illicit drug market”, in Home Office, “Measuring different aspects of problem drug use: methodo-
logical developments”, Home Office Online Report 16/06; Updates from an original paper undertaken by John Walker for the 
Australian Institute of Criminology in 1992, quoted in Brigitte Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2007); FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report, February 2010 and International Monetary Fund, March 
2010; International Monetary Fund, “Germany: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financ-
ing of Terrorism”, IMF Country Report No. 10/78 (Washington D.C., February 2010). Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden; Consiglio 
Italiano per le Scienze Sociali, Il mercato illecito and SOS Impresa, XII Rapporto – Le mani della criminalità sulle imprese (Rome, SOS, 
27 January 2010).
a Partial estimate of a limited number of selected crimes. 
b A combined category of fraud and tax evasion was reported for the Netherlands; in order to provide an estimate of total crime,  
 excluding tax evasion, it was assumed that the same breakdown existed in the Netherlands as in Germany. 
c Country results weighted by their gross domestic product in 2009.
  As a percentage of gross domestic product
Year of  
estimate Drugs
Total crime,
excluding tax evasion
Total crime,
including tax evasion
United States 2000 0.7% 2.3 % 8.0%
United Kingdom 1996/2003/04 0.5% 1.2% a n.a.
Australia 2003 0.3% 1.5 % n.a.
Netherlands 2003 0.4% 1.7% b 3.5%
Germany 2007 0.4% 1.3 % 2.3%
Italy 2009 0.7% 7.7 % n.a.
Unweighted 
average  
0.5%
(0.4%-0.6%)
2.6 % 
(0.6%-4.6%)
4.6% 
(2.2%-7.0%)
Weighted  
average c  
0.6%
(0.5%-0.7%)
2.5 % 
(0.5%-4.5%)
5.3%
(2.9%-7.7%)
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Accounting for 42 per cent of the total proceeds of 
organized crime after tax fraud was excluded,52 drugs 
were even more important in seven western Euro-
pean countries — Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom — when 
taken together.
According to the statistical office of the European 
Union, Eurostat, European households in 21 Euro-
pean member states spent a total of 21 billion euros 
52 Ibid.
The 2010 estimate in the European Union was 
equivalent to roughly 25 per cent of overall crimi-
nal proceeds, making drugs the third largest source 
of income from organized crime there, after tax 
fraud and counterfeiting. Excluding tax fraud, 
drugs accounted for 34 per cent of total revenues 
of organized crime in the European Union.51 
51 Savona and Riccardi, eds., From Illegal Markets to Legiti-
mate Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe. 
Table 3 Revenues from illicit markets per year (billions of euros)
Source: Savona and Riccardi, eds., From Illegal Markets to Legitimate Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe.
a Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom.
Illicit market Seven western  European countriesa
European  
Union
Illicit drugs 20.2 27.7
Trafficking in human beings Estimate available in only a few European countries
Illicit trafficking in firearms - 0.4
Illicit trade in tobacco products 5.2 9.4
Counterfeiting 21.6 42.7
Illegal gambling Estimate available in only a few European countries
Extortion racketeering Estimate available in only a few European countries
Usury Estimate available in only a few European countries
Missing trade Intra-community fraud 16.9 29.3
Cargo theft 0.36 0.42
Total 64.2 109.9
Table 4 Illicit drug retail sales in constant currency units and expressed as a percentage of gross 
domestic product in the United States and 21 European Union countries
Sources: UNODC calculations, based on: Kilmer and others, What Americas Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 2000-2010; World 
Bank, World Development Indicators; Eurostat, Eurostat database. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 
a Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
Note: Two dots indicate that data are not available.
1988 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Retail drug sales in constant currency units
United States In constant 2010 $ (billions) 195 146 95 108 119 109 ..
21 European Union 
countries*
In constant 2010 euros 
(billions) .. .. 13.1 15.3 19.2 19.2 18.0
Retail drug sales as a proportion of gross domestic product
United States % of GDP 2.22 1.57 0.90 0.85 0.83 0.74 ..
21 European Union 
countries* % of GDP .. .. 0.62 0.49 0.37 0.34 0.32
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In Afghanistan, the net value of opiate exports fluc-
tuated between 7 per cent and 16 per cent of GDP 
over the period 2011-2016, according to UNODC 
estimates.56 
In Colombia, according to some studies, the illicit 
income from all crime activities (including drugs) 
has fallen consistently for almost two decades. The 
decline in drug-related income in Colombia went 
in parallel with an overall reduction in the area under 
coca cultivation — by roughly 70 per cent over the 
period 2000-2013 — as well as strong declines in 
opium production.57
Laundering drug profits
Estimates suggest that well over half of the gross 
profits generated by the drug trade are channelled 
into money laundering.
In the late 1980s, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) assumed that between two thirds and 70 
per cent of drug money was laundered.58 The FATF 
56 Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN)  
and UNODC, Sustainable Development in an Opium  
Production Environment – Afghanistan Opium Survey Report 
2016 (Vienna, 2017) and previous years.
57 World Drug Report 2016 and previous years.
58 United Nations International Drug Control Programme 
(0.3 per cent of GDP) on drugs in 2015. This esti-
mate, based on figures from countries representing 
around half of the total GDP of the European 
Union,53 showed a decline compared with 1995, 
when spending was estimated at 0.6 per cent of 
GDP.54 A similar decline has also been observed in 
the United States in the past two decades; illicit drug 
sales fell from 1.6 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 0.7 
per cent in 2010. 
Drug sales expressed in constant currency units have 
fallen in the United States since the late 1980s, but 
in Europe they have increased over the past two 
decades. This suggests that the marked decline in 
the proportion of drug sales to GDP in Europe is 
the result of stronger growth of GDP in other sec-
tors rather than a declining drug market. 
Drug sales increased in the 21 European Union 
countries by some 50 per cent from 1995 to 2008, 
the year when the global financial crisis hit. From 
2008 to 2015, sales declined by some 10 per cent. 
Drug sales in both Spain and the United Kingdom 
(0.6 and 0.4 per cent, respectively, of GDP) declined 
by 15 per cent over the period 2008-2015. The larg-
est decline was reported by Cyprus. This could 
suggest a link between drug sales and the financial 
crisis. However, estimates from Greece show a strong 
increase in drug sales over the period 2008-2015 
(31 per cent), suggesting that the financial crisis was 
not necessarily the determining factor for explain-
ing changes in the drug markets. Meanwhile, 
countries including Austria, Finland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden all recorded drug 
sales as less than 0.1 per cent of GDP in 2015.55 
Drug proceeds in major drug-producing 
countries
In contrast to the European Union or the United 
States, where drug markets represent a very small 
proportion of the total economy, in present-day 
Afghanistan and in Colombia at the turn of the mil-
lennium, the situation was very different. 
53 All European Union countries with the exception of 
Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands  
and Poland.
54 Eurostat database. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
data/database.
55 Ibid.
Fig. 2 Estimated drug expenditure by households in 
21 European Union countries
Source: EUROSTAT.
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Another UNODC study developed a more detailed 
model for the cocaine trade: the share available for 
money laundering of both retail sales (proceeds) and 
gross profits was estimated at 62 per cent in 2009.61 
But the proportion varied hugely along the supply 
chain. At the retail level, on average 44 per cent of 
gross profit from cocaine was available for money 
laundering; the proportion rose to 92 per cent at 
the wholesale level.
The UNODC study also suggested that the figure 
varied according to location. Overall, the propor-
tion of gross profits available for laundering at the 
wholesale level ranged from 87 to 94 per cent, and 
61 Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug  
Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime.
study, one of the first to make such an estimate, 
based its figures on interviews with experts in the 
field.
The conclusions broadly tally with a UNODC 
review of the literature from Australia, the Nether-
lands and the United States in 2011.59 Those studies 
used different methodologies, but the overall aver-
age proportion of money available for laundering 
out of crime proceeds was roughly 70 per cent, with 
reported figures ranging from 39 per cent to 83 per 
cent.60 Most of this money would be laundered 
though a small proportion of the cash may also be 
hidden and stocked for use at a later stage.
(UNDCP), Economic and Social Consequences of Drug 
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, UNDCP Technical Series No. 
6 (Vienna, 1998); International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
“Financial system abuse, financial crime and money laun-
dering – background paper” (12 February 2001).
59 UNODC, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from 
Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime, 
Research report (October 2011), pp. 70-91.
60 John Walker, “Estimates of the extent of money laundering 
in and through Australia,” paper prepared for Australian 
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, (Queanbeyan, 
Australia, John Walker Consulting Services, September 
1995); John Walker and Brigitte Unger, “Measuring global 
money laundering: the Walker gravity model”, Review of 
Law and Economics, vol 5 (2009); Brigitte Unger, The Scale 
and Impacts of Money Laundering (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Company, 2007); Douglas Farah, “Money 
laundering and bulk cash smuggling: challenges for the 
Mérida Initiative”, Working Paper Series on U.S.-Mexico 
Security Cooperation, Woodrow Wilson Center for Inter-
national Scholars/Trans-Border Institute, University of San 
Diego, May 2010); United States, ONDCP, What America’s 
Drug Users Spend on Illicit Drugs, 1988-2000, (Washington 
D.C., 2001); National Drug Intelligence Centre, National 
Drug Threat Assessment 2009, (Illicit Finance – Bulk Cash 
Smuggling) (Washington D.C., December 2008).
Table 5 Financial Action Task Force estimates of global amounts laundered in the late 1980s 
Source: Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, UNDCP Technical Series No. 6, Vienna 1998; 
International Monetary Fund, Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering-Background Paper, February 2001.
Estimate of drug sales in key markets (1988) $124 billion
As a percentage of global GDP (1988) 0.8%
Assumed proportion that is laundered 2/3 - 70%
Estimate of amounts laundered related to drugs $85 billion
Proportion of global GDP (1988) 0.5% of GDP
Estimated proportion of drugs in total amounts laundered 25%
Estimated total amounts laundered in 1988 $340 billion
As a percentage of global GDP 2.0% of GDP
Sectors where organized 
crime invests profits
 • Businesses that use cash
 • Low-tech, labour-intensive and not  
export-oriented sectors
 • Sectors with a high involvement of public  
administration and/or public subsidies
 • Territorial-specific sectors, which can benefit 
and/or facilitate the control of the territory  
by criminal groups
 • Sectors with weak or developing regulation, 
which may imply weaker monitoring or more 
infiltration opportunities (for example, renew-
able energy or gaming)
Source: Savona and Riccardi, eds., From Illegal  
Markets to Legitimate Businesses: the Portfolio of 
Organised Crime in Europe.
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Cross-border laundering:  
illicit financial flows
Drug traffickers spend their profits in a variety of 
ways — from buying luxury items such as yachts 
and jewellery, to investing in real estate and using 
offshore financial centres. Some traffickers use laun-
dering networks embedded into their overall 
organizational structure and directly employ 
accountants and lawyers; other groups outsource to 
“independent” networks that specialize in hiding 
the proceeds of crime. With the slow decline of 
hierarchical crime organizations and the emergence 
of loose hierarchical or networked structures, the 
trend is moving towards professional outsourcing. 
While some drug money is laundered inside the 
country, some is hidden or reinvested across borders, 
constituting drug-related illicit financial flows. There 
is very limited information on the proportion and 
level of drug profits that are laundered outside the 
country. As with any commercial business, this will 
most likely depend on where the profits are to be 
enjoyed, and the margins that can be made on top 
of the money generated. 
A model developed by UNODC for the 2009 
cocaine market estimated that about 30 per cent of 
cocaine proceeds at the global level64 translated into 
illicit financial flows.65 Another study based on 
interviews with prisoners involved in the drug trade 
Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe. 
64 The model arrived at a similar estimate for the proportion 
of gross profits from cocaine translating into illicit financial 
flows. 
65 Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug 
Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime.
at the retail level from 32 to 50 per cent, between 
subregions. In North America, about half of cocaine-
related gross profits at the retail level were available 
for laundering; in Western and Central Europe, the 
proportion was slightly lower (44 per cent). These 
figures suggested that 35 per cent of the income 
generated in cocaine retail sales in North America 
and 26 per cent in Western and Central Europe 
were available for laundering purposes.62 Similarly, 
a study of seven western European countries (Fin-
land, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain 
and United Kingdom) by Transcrime showed a 
broadly similar picture for heroin at the retail level. 
The study estimated that between 25 per cent and 
42 per cent of overall heroin retail sales in 2010 were 
available for investment into the legal economy; 
another way of saying that those funds were avail-
able for money laundering.63 
62 Ibid.
63 Savona and Riccardi, eds., From Illegal Markets to Legitimate 
Table 6 Net profits generated from the supply of heroin in seven western European countries 
(millions of euros)
Source: Savona and Riccardi, eds., From Illegal Markets to Legitimate Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe.
Retail Middle market Wholesale Total
min max min max min max min max
Revenues 4.56 7.60 2.78 4.62 2.27 3.75 4.56 7.60
Gross profits 1.77 2.97 0.51 0.87 0.65 1.09 2.93 4.94
Net profits  
(funds available for money laundering) 0.08 1.28 0.44 0.80 0.64 1.08 1.16 3.16
Net margin (proportion of revenues 
available for money laundering) 2% 17% 16% 17% 28% 29% 25% 42%
How drug money is  
laundered
 • Cash, including smuggling and stockpiling
 • Hawala, an informal system of money transfer
 • Purchase of real estate and related  
construction activities
 • Investment into cash-generating activities  
such as restaurants, casinos, red-light  
entertainment, gas stations
 • Purchase of luxury items such as villas 
yachts, jewels
 • Investment in offshore centres
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Economic impact of drug money
The flow of drug money from the hands of traffick-
ers, through launderers, and finally into the licit 
economy, has all sorts of complex socioeconomic 
effects. 
In the short term, an inflow of drug money back 
into the economy can boost investment and local 
GDP, generating employment and revenue. The 
long-term effects, however, tend to be negative, par-
ticularly when drug-related proceeds comprise a 
relatively larger portion of the total economy of a 
community or a country. In this scenario, drug 
money has the potential to inflate property prices, 
distort export figures, create unfair competition, 
reinforce skewed income and wealth distributions,69 
69 World Drug Report 2012; Estimating Illicit Financial Flows 
Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational 
Organized Crime; IMF, Anti-Money Laundering and Com-
bating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Report on 
the Review of the Effectiveness of the Program (Washington 
D.C., May 2011), Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money 
Laundering; Naím, Moisés, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers 
and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (London, 
William Heinemann, 2006); Francisco E. Thoumi, Illegal 
Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes (Washington D.C., 
Woodrow Wilson Press, 2003); International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB), Report of the International Narcotics 
Control Board for 2002 (New York, 2002); UNDCP, “The 
social impact of drug abuse”, prepared for World Summit 
for Social Development, Copenhagen 6-12 March 1995; 
Lamond Tullis, “Illegal drugs in nine countries − socio-
economic and political consequences”, report prepared for 
in Italy came to a similar conclusion, suggesting that 
roughly a third of the money spent by cocaine users 
was being laundered across borders.66
But drug trafficking groups trying to launder money 
outside their countries will face costs, which will 
reduce the actual amounts that can be invested back 
into the licit economy. Large-scale operations 
looking to launder hundreds of millions of dollars 
could face fees of between 5 and 10 per cent, 
according to testimony from an undercover agent 
of the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration who worked as a money launderer 
for a major cocaine smuggling operation in 
Colombia and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ).67 
Examples from Afghanistan suggest that people 
using the informal hawala money remittance system 
had to pay 1 to 2 per cent of the total funds for a 
money transfer.68 
66 Jonathan Caulkins and others, “Modelling the structure and 
operation of drug supply chains: the case of cocaine and 
heroin in Italy and Slovenia”, International Journal of Drug 
Policy (Elsevier, 2016), pp. 64-73.
67 Affidavit of Jaime X. Cepero, in Federal District Court of 
Massachusetts, 9 August 2013 (Melvin Soudijn and Peter 
Reuter, “Cash and carry: the high cost of currency smug-
gling in the drug trade”, Crime Law and Social Change, vol. 
66, No. 3 (Heidelberg, Springer, 2016), pp. 1-20)).
68 Ibid; Samuel Munzele Maimbo, “The money exchange 
dealers of Kabul, a study of the hawala system in Afghani-
stan”, Working Paper No. 13 (World Bank, Washington 
D.C., 2003).
What are illicit financial flows? 
The term “illicit financial flows” is often used in different 
contexts where it may be associated with different mean-
ings and objectives.a Early literature on illicit financial 
flows focused on capital flight from developing countries 
and disregarded whether the sources were licit or illicit. 
Critics say this methodology fails to capture processes 
such as bulk cash transfers, hawala payments or other 
transactions completed outside the official financial 
system.b, c 
Other approaches more explicitly link illicit financial flows 
to the outcome of illicit activities or the financing of 
organized crime and terrorism. 
The most widely used definition nowadays considers 
illicit financial flows to be generated when crime-related 
proceeds (including money illegally earned, transferred 
or used) cross borders. 
a World Bank, The World Bank Group’s Response to Illicit 
Financial Flows: A Stocktaking (March 22, 2016). 
b Volker Nitsch, “Trillion dollar estimate: illicit financial 
flows from developing countries”, Darmstadt Discussions 
Papers in Economics, (December 2015). Available at: 
http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/5437/1/ddpie_227.
pdf.
c Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, Financial Flows from Devel-
oping Countries: 2004-2013 (Global Financial Integrity, 
December 2015). 
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combat all illicit financial flows.74 Financial centres 
that do not adhere to international rules and 
regulations face legal sanctions75 and may eventually 
lose access to global financial markets, which could 
have potentially negative consequences for their own 
economic stability. 
74 Doha Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice into the Wider United Nations Agenda to 
Address Social and Economic Challenges and to Promote 
the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, 
and Public Participation (General Assembly resolution 
70/174, annex).
75 Brent. L. Bartlett, “The negative effects of money launder-
ing on economic development”, report for the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (May 2002).
and increase corruption. In the process, legitimate 
businesses, without access to illicit funds, may be 
squeezed out of the market, and new legitimate 
investments may not take place.70 The rise of an 
illicit economy helps to weaken the rule of law and 
facilitates corruption, which in turn reinforces the 
vicious economic cycle. 
When large amounts of illicit funds are available in 
an economy, criminally financed entities may take 
over some lending functions. In cases like those, 
government actions designed to stop economies 
from overheating, such as enforcing a restrictive 
monetary policy, may not work. This may prompt 
even more drastic monetary and fiscal measures. 
Money laundering can lead to volatility in exchange 
rates and interest rates owing to unanticipated 
inflows and outflows of capital, all of which tends 
to have a negative impact on overall economic 
growth.71 
Studies suggest that the flow of laundered money, 
including drug proceeds, back into the domestic 
economy is associated with reductions in overall 
annual economic growth rates,72 particularly in 
smaller and less developed countries. One estimate, 
based on a study of 17 OECD countries, suggested 
that a $1 billion increase in money laundering can 
reduce overall economic growth by between 0.03 
and 0.06 percentage points.73 
Several tax havens around the globe have been 
involved in money laundering activities — actively 
or unwittingly — and seem to have thrived 
economically, having witnessed an expansion in their 
financial service sectors. But international tolerance 
towards such behaviour is wearing thin, and calls 
have been made to develop strategies to prevent and 
UNRISD and the United Nations University, published as 
Unintended Consequences; Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in 
Nine Countries (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1995); 
UNDCP, “Drugs and development”, UNDCP Technical 
Series, No. 1 (Vienna, 1994); UNDCP, Economic and Social 
Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, UNDCP 
Technical Series, No. 6 (Vienna, 1998). 
70 “Economic and Social Consequences of Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking.
71 Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug  
Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime.
72 Peter J. Quirk, “Money laundering: muddying the macro-
economy”, Finance & Development, vol. 34, No. 1 (IMF, 
March 1997), pp. 4-9.
73 Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering.
How drug money affects the 
economy
 • Distorts resource allocation from high-yielding 
investments to investments that run a low risk 
of detectiona
 • Distorts prices, including in the real estate 
sectorb 
 • Distorts exports and creates potential problems 
with investment and economic 
 • Creates unfair competition
 • Crowds out licit activities and negatively  
affects direct foreign investmentc
 • Deepens corruption 
 • Strengthens skewed income and wealth  
distributionsd
a Bartlett, “The negative effects of money laundering 
on economic development”, p. 30; Estimating Illicit 
Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and 
Other Transnational Organized Crime; INCB, Report 
of the International Narcotics Control Board for 
2002, Sales No. E.03.XI.1, New York 2002.
b Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug 
Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime; 
Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the 
Andes.
c Christine Ebrahimzadeh, “Dutch disease: wealth 
managed unwisely”, IMF (28 March 2012). Avail-
able at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/
dutch.htm. 
d World Drug Report 2012; Estimating Illicit Financial 
Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other 
Transnational Organized Crime.
30
W
O
RL
D
 D
R
U
G
 R
EP
O
RT
 2
01
7
Despite this, there have been few attempts to get to 
grips with the relationship between the drug prob-
lem and corruption. Previous studies focused on 
specific events or geographical areas, but they have 
rarely taken a wider approach or tried to identify 
elements of the relationship across the whole illicit 
drug market. Better understanding of this relation-
ship is vital not only to combat the illicit drug trade, 
but also to reduce corruption.
Importance of assessing levels of  
corruption 
The Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta have long ben-
efited from high-level political connections in 
Italy.77 In a similar way, some Mexican drug cartels 
allegedly benefited from protection from local police 
and local politicians.78 In Guinea Bissau, interna-
tional drug traffickers counted on the support of 
influential segments within the political and military 
apparatus for a number of years.79 
This kind of activity is often called high-level cor-
ruption. It involves a small number of senior officials 
in the government, police, customs or the justice 
system being targeted in a business transaction with 
bribes in exchange for either passive or active sup-
port facilitating illegal activities. In several cases 
high-level corruption has posed a threat to the State. 
Organized criminal groups have attempted to influ-
ence the outcome of democratic processes; for 
example, by funding election campaigns in favour 
of specific candidates or political parties through 
“vote buying”, intimidation or corrupting partici-
pants in the political process. Moreover, a corrupted 
judicial system and a lack of prison governance 
results in relative impunity.
By contrast, in the European Union much of the 
corruption reported appears to be on a low level, 
according to research by Europol.80 Political cor-
77 Letizia Paoli, “Italian organised crime: mafia associations 
and criminal enterprises”, Global Crime, vol. 6, No. 1 
(Taylor & Francis Group, February 2004), pp. 19-31.
78 Richard Snyder and Angélica Durán-Martinez, “Drugs, 
violence, and state-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico 
and Colombia”, Colombia Internacional, No. 70 (Bogotá, 
Universidad de los Andes, July/Dec. 2009), pp. 61-91.
79 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: 
A Threat Assessment (Vienna, February 2013); UNODC, 
Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa (Vienna, 
November 2008). 
80 EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2016, 
C. THE DRUG PROBLEM AND 
CORRUPTION
The drug problem and corruption have a mutually 
reinforcing relationship. Corruption facilitates the 
production and trafficking of illegal drugs and this, 
in turn, benefits corruption.76 The wealth and 
power of some drug trafficking organizations can 
exceed that of local governments, allowing them to 
buy protection from law enforcement agents, crimi-
nal justice institutions, politicians and the business 
sector. In doing so, they further reinforce corrup-
tion. The rule of law is both an immediate victim 
and, if it is already weak, an underlying factor that 
feeds this cycle.
76 Franciso Thoumi, Debates y Paradigmas de las Políticas de 
Drogas en el Mundo (Bogotá, 2015). 
What the United Nations 
Conventions say
“[I]llicit traffic generates large financial profits and 
wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations 
to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures 
of government, legitimate commercial and financial 
business, and society at all its levels”. 
Preamble to the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, 1988. 
“Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide 
range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines 
democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of 
human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of 
life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other 
threats to human security to flourish”.
Forward to the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption (UNCAC, 2003).
“Pursuant to article 4, paragraph 1, of the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, which states 
that States parties shall carry out their obligations 
under the Convention in a manner consistent with 
the principles of sovereign equality and territo-
rial integrity of States and non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other States, the Conference of 
the States Parties to the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption establishes the … mechanism to 
review implementation of the Convention.”
Terms of reference of the Mechanism for the Review 
of Implementation of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption.
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Different factors may affect the level of vulnerability 
of an institution. For example, if law enforcement 
officials and magistrates are paid barely enough to 
provide for their households or believe they are 
treated unfairly, they may be more vulnerable to 
bribes. Indeed, research suggests that an official’s 
perception of how he or she is treated may have a 
greater effect on the organizational culture of integ-
rity than the size of remuneration itself.84, 85, 86, 87, 
88 Other important factors include the existence of 
effective internal control mechanisms, a strong 
organizational culture of ethics, or the presence of 
transparency and accountability mechanisms that 
help to promote public trust.
Prosperity, corruption and  
drug markets
The connection between corruption and eco-
nomic development is often portrayed as 
asymmetrical: the lower the level of development, 
the greater the corruption. While there is evidence 
that this is true for bribery and other forms of 
low-level corruption, less is known about high-
level corruption in general. 
Less advanced economies may not have the abun-
dance of public resources available to build up strong 
institutions resilient to corruption, yet corruption 
itself will impede the process of generating, collect-
ing and allocating such resources. Corruption and 
related forms of crime such as extortion discourage 
84 “Fighting fraud in the Government”, Austin Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners. Available at: www.acfe.com/gf/.
85 Jeremy D. Foltz and Kweku A. Opoku-Agyemang, “Do 
higher salaries lower petty corruption? A policy experiment 
on West Africa’s highways”. Available at http://cega.berkeley.
edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/118_-_Opoku-Agyemang_
Ghana_Police_Corruption_paper_revised_v3.pdf.
86 Ting Gong and Alfred M. Wu, “Does increased civil service 
pay deter corruption? evidence from China”, MPRA Paper 
No. 41815 (Munich University Library, 2012). Available 
at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41815/1/MPRA_
paper_41815.pdf.
87 Deon Filmer and David L. Lindauer, “Does Indonesia have 
a “low pay” civil service?” Available at http://citeseerx.ist.
psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.17.9760&rep=rep1
&type=pdf.
88 Mushtaq H. Khan, “Governance and anti-corruption 
reforms in developing countries: policies, evidence and ways 
forward”, United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment, G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 42 (November 
2006). Available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmd-
pbg2420064_en.pdf.
ruption at the level of elected national representatives 
or agency heads appears to be rare. However, 
Europol found that corruption of city councillors, 
mayors and other local level politicians was more 
common, especially in cities along the European 
Union’s eastern land border.81 Overall, Europol con-
cluded that organized crime groups involved in drug 
trafficking in Europe rely on corruption to facilitate 
their trafficking activities.82 
The impact of high and low level corruption on local 
drug consumption and levels of violence is not 
always evident. The relationship with violence is 
neither straightforward, nor well understood. Vio-
lence is not always a direct outcome of drug 
trafficking, as demonstrated by the very different 
levels of violence registered worldwide in key transit 
or manufacturing countries.83 Whether more cor-
ruption means more or less violence is equally 
context specific. Depending on the underlying pur-
pose of a bribe, the consequences may be different. 
Corruption is typically associated with weakened 
institutions; and weakened law enforcement bodies 
are by definition less capable of containing violent 
crime. In certain environments a corrupt equilibrium 
may temporarily create the impression of reduced 
violence; however, the negative effects of corruption 
in general become evident in the long run.
Corruption along the drug  
supply chain 
For criminal organizations, the expected results of 
corrupting a public sector organization vary depend-
ing on the agency involved. For example, a criminal 
organization may seek to corrupt a customs officer 
to smooth the passage of drugs — by looking the 
other way when a shipment is passing or by inform-
ing traffickers of checks. Police may be targeted to 
obtain inside information on planned operations in 
order to protect ongoing illegal activities. Judges 
and prosecutors could be bribed or otherwise influ-
enced to undermine police investigations, influence 
witnesses, reduce sentences or provide special prison 
treatment.
EMCDDA – Europol Joint publications (Luxembourg,  
Publications Office of the European Union, 2026), p. 38.
81 EU Drug Markets Report 2016.
82 SOCTA 2017.
83 World Drug Report 2016.
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foreign investment.89 This becomes even more 
pronounced if a country begins to develop a narco-
economy; foreign businesses may decide to pull 
investment once they find out that the justice system 
89 World Bank, “Combatting corruption”, 11 May 2017. 
Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/govern-
ance/brief/anti-corruption. 
investment, entrepreneurship and business forma-
tion (which have prerequisites such as the rule of 
law and procedural transparency) and ultimately 
may be responsible for the hindrance of prosperity 
and economic development.
More broadly, World Bank research suggests that 
corruption entrenches poverty by discouraging 
Fig. 3 Sectors vulnerable to corruption in relation to drugs
Source: EUROSTAT.
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the expansion of drug production and trafficking.95 
In unequal societies, members of marginalized 
groups may view corruption and involvement in 
criminal organizations as a viable way to improve 
their lives.96 
Overall, corruption enables the growth of the illicit 
economy, which includes the illicit drug trade97 and 
many other illegal activities, such as trafficking in 
cigarettes, persons, guns or counterfeit goods. A 
study for the European Union showed that levels of 
corruption and organized crime activities were 
highly correlated.98 This was particularly true for 
the illicit drug trade; the only criminal activity that 
benefited more from corruption was prostitution.99
95 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002.
96 World Drug Report 2012. 
97 SOCTA 2013; Michele Riccardi and Federica Sarno,  
“Corruption”, Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, Gerben Bruinsma and David Weisbud, eds. (New 
York, Springer, 2013).
98 Philip Gounev and Tihomir Bezlov, Examining the Links 
Between Organised Crime and Corruption (Sofia, Center for 
the Study of Democracy, 2010).
99 Gouev and Bezlov, Examining the Links Between Organised 
does not work any longer, correspondent banks close 
down as money laundering risks become too high, 
and potential investors steer clear because they fear 
their international image might suffer. All of this 
leads to lower levels of investment and growth, and 
a decline in some productive sectors of the 
economy.90 
In situations like that, local authorities may pay less 
attention to the origin of investment funds and 
accept criminal finance to fill the void. Moreover, 
corruption negatively affects business by raising 
transaction costs, which reduces investors’ 
competitiveness and leads to a poorer financial 
performance overall.91
Studies confirm the relationship between develop-
ment and bribery levels. As figure 4 shows, when 
the prevalence of bribery experienced by individuals 
in their dealings with public officials is analysed,92 
it suggests that the police and the judiciary are the 
sectors most likely to be bribed in countries with 
low economic development.
According to research by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), corruption also increases the level of 
income inequality.93 This process particularly affects 
the poorer members of society, who can expect their 
income growth to be reduced and the likelihood of 
poverty to increase.
Higher levels of income inequality are also known 
to provoke drug trafficking and corruption.94 In 
fact, the drug industry may perpetuate and exacer-
bate income inequality, which may in turn cause 
90 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002, 
pp 1-10. 
91 Oman E. Hawthorne, “Do international corruption metrics 
matter? Assessing the impact of Transparency International's 
Corruption Perceptions Index”, Dissertation, Old Domin-
ion University (2015), pp. 77-78. 
92 The prevalence of bribery is defined here as the percentage 
of the population that had contact with a public official 
and paid at least one bribe to such an official in the past 12 
months.
93 Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi and Rosa Alonso-Terme, 
“Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?”, 
Governance, Corruption, & Economic Performance, George. 
T. Abed and Sanjeev Gupta, eds., Chapter 17 (IMF, 2002); 
Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi and Rosa Alonso-Terme, 
“Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?”, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/98/76 (May 1998). 
94 World Drug Report 2012 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.12.XI.1). 
Fig. 4 Prevalence of bribery, by type of public official 
and by level of income, 2013
Source: United Nations, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal  
Justice, World crime trends and emerging issues and responses in the field 
of crime prevention and criminal justice, 20 March 2016 E/CN/15/2016/10.
Note: The average of eight types of public official includes officials from the  
following sectors: education, judiciary, medical and health, police, registry and 
permits, utilities, tax revenues and customs, and land services.
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D. DRUGS, TERRORISM AND 
INSURGENCY100
From Latin America to the Middle East, funding 
for armed violence has in certain instances long been 
linked to the illicit drug trade.
By some estimates, around half of the income of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan comes from its involvement 
with narcotics (mostly opiates);101 and FARC 
appears to have relied heavily on the cocaine trade 
for much of the past two decades — until recently 
— with estimates a few years ago suggesting that 
between one quarter and half of its total income was 
derived from such illicit drug activities. Armed 
groups in the Syrian Arab Republic are said to use 
amphetamine pills, and there are indications that 
terrorist organizations in West Africa might be 
involved in cocaine and cannabis smuggling.
The drug trade has been a significant source of 
income for some of those groups, for others it has 
100 This section covers entities placed on the Consolidated 
United Nations Security Council Sanctions list and other 
insurgent and non-State armed groups.
101 Seventh report the Analytical Support and Sanctions Moni-
toring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015) 
concerning the Taliban and other associated individual and 
entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and  
security of Afghanistan, S/2016/842, para. 15. 
Closing information gaps
Much of the available information provides only a 
glimpse of the mechanisms of corruption used by 
traffickers. In addition to systematic reviews of drug 
and corruption prevention programmes to establish 
the most effective strategies, there is also a need for 
more detailed factual knowledge. 
Many studies rely on “perceptions” of corruption. 
Important as this is to gauge public sentiment, other 
data are needed on the extent and nature of corrup-
tion across countries, and the ways in which it affects 
drug trafficking. The links between high-level and 
low-level corruption must be analysed to assess 
where each form is most likely to emerge, and how 
it will interact with different drug markets and polit-
ical structures.
Finally, the relationship between corruption and 
violence needs further investigation. In some con-
texts it appears that corruption subdues violence; in 
other contexts drug trafficking organizations appear 
to be pushed towards greater levels of violence. 
Crime and Corruption, quoted in EU Drug Markets Report 
2016.
How to fight corruption
The United Nations Convention on Corruption suggests a list of possible strategies to prevent and fight corruption, including:
 • Strengthening the effectiveness of law enforcement 
institutions, including through the introduction of fur-
ther development of fair, merit-based human resource 
management practices, providing regular training and 
ensuring proper scrutiny of key personnel, such as back-
ground checks.
 • Introducing codes of ethics and addressing conflicts of 
interest, inter alia through the introduction of assets 
and interest declarations systems. 
 • Considering rotation of officers in vulnerable positions 
where feasible to avoid creating permanent links with 
organized crime groups.
 • Identifying the specific corruption risks in organizations 
and developing and implementing specific plans to ad-
dress and mitigate them. 
 • Promoting the cooperation across different agencies to 
reduce the likelihood of success from bribing a limited 
number of officials and to increase the risk of detection.
 • Ensuring that an array of enforcement measures exists 
to address corruption, including criminal justice and  
administrative or disciplinary procedures, as well as  
establishing effective systems for recovery of assets.
 • Promoting effective international cooperation, including 
exchange of financial information.
 • Establishing systems to encourage reporting of corrup-
tion by public officials and citizens as well as undertak-
ing measures to protect reporting persons from retalia-
tion or victimization. To this effect many countries make 
anonymous reporting of corruption possible.
 • Introducing effective witness protection systems. 
 • Promoting transparency in funding of election  
campaigns, politicians and political parties.
 • Raising the awareness of society as a whole, including 
students in schools and universities about negative  
consequences of corruption.
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relates to the Taliban, which has taxed entities 
involved in illicit drug production, manufacture and 
trafficking. It has also been directly involved in drug 
trafficking.104 
Some evidence suggests that Al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb, which operates primarily in North and 
West Africa, has been involved in cannabis and 
cocaine trafficking, or at least in protecting 
traffickers,105 though the group’s overall income 
from the drug sector appears to have been rather 
modest.106 Individual commanders of the Move-
ment for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, which 
broke away from Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, 
seem at present to be directly involved in drug 
trafficking.107
In and around the Syrian Arab Republic, seizure 
data on “captagon” pills — typically amphetamine 
mixed with caffeine — suggest that a manufacturing 
hub exists in the area of operations of ISIL, Al-Qa-
ida offshoot Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known 
as Al-Nusrah Front)108, 109 and other armed 
groups.110 ISIL and other non-State armed groups 
have been linked in media reports to the production 
of “captagon”, but no conclusive evidence has 
104 Security Council, “Letter dated 18 August 2015 from the 
Chair of the Security Council Committee established pur-
suant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President 
of the Security Council” (26 August 2015); UNODC, The 
Opium Economy in Afghanistan, An International Problem 
(New York, 2003); UNODC, Addiction, Crime and Insur-
gency – The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium (Vienna 
2009); UNODC, The Global Afghan Opium Trade – A 
Threat Assessment (Vienna, July 2011). 
105 Daurius Figueria, Cocaine Trafficking in the Caribbean and 
West Africa in the Era of the Mexican Cartels (iUniverse, 
Bloomington, Indiana, November 2012); Stephen A. 
Harmon, Terror and Insurgency in the Sahara-Sahel Region: 
Corruption, Contraband, Jihad and the Mali War of 2012-
2013 (Routledge, 2014).
106 Marc Mémier, “Aqmi et Al-Mourabitoun: le djihad sahélien 
réunifié ?” Études de l'Ifri (January 2017), pp. 31-34. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Report of the Secretary-General on the threat of ter-
rorists benefiting from transnational organized crime 
(S/2015/366).
109 The Al-Nusrah Front was rebranded in 2016 as Jabhat 
Fateh al-Sham and announced breaking ties with Al-Qaida 
(ABC News, “Syrian branch of Al Qaeda rebrands in effort 
to escape foreign air strikes”, 29 July 2016. Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-29/al-nusra-rebrands-
in-effort-to-escape-foreign-air-strikes/7671390).
110 World Drug Report 2016.
been one of many revenue streams, while in some 
cases it may hardly have played a role at all. 
Terrorist, insurgent and non-State 
armed groups
While there is no universally agreed definition of 
terrorism, the United Nations Security Council, 
regional organizations and Member State Govern-
ments have designated numerous armed groups as 
“terrorist” groups, and international treaties define 
terrorist offences. The Security Council has imposed 
sanctions on some 80 groups and more than 380 
individuals linked to the Taliban, Al-Qaida and 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the 
grounds that they are involved in terrorist activities 
or support such activities.102 The Taliban, Al-Qaida, 
ISIL and its affiliate Boko Haram were responsible 
for 74 per cent of all deaths caused by terrorist, 
insurgent and non-State armed groups in 2015.103
The most comprehensive evidence linking the ter-
rorist groups on which the Security Council has 
imposed sanctions in relation to the drug trade 
102 See the Consolidated United Nations Security Council 
Sanctions list. 
103 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 
2016. Available at http://visionofhumanity.org/?s=%22Glob
al+Terrorism+Index+2016%22.
What the United Nations says
“We, the States Members of the United Nations… 
[e]xpress deep concern about links between illicit 
drug production, trafficking and involvement of ter-
rorist groups, criminals and transnational organized 
crime, and are resolved to strengthen our coopera-
tion in response to those threats.”
Political Declaration adopted by the special session of 
the General Assembly in June 1998.
The General Assembly highlighted the need to 
“[r]espond to the serious challenges posed by the 
increasing links between drug trafficking, … cyber-
crime and money-laundering, and in some cases 
terrorism, including money-laundering in connection 
with the financing of terrorism”.
Outcome document of the special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly on the world drug problem held in 
2016 (General Assembly resolution S-30/1, annex).
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More recently, opium cultivation declined rapidly 
in some districts of the Afghan province of Nangar-
har in 2016 after ISIL banned the practice in areas 
under its control. Neighbouring districts, by con-
trast, saw huge increases in cultivation in the same 
period.116 However, ISIL does not appear to have 
a consistent anti-drug stance. The Security Council 
Committee reported that ISIL fought against the 
Taliban in 2015 for control of drug trafficking prof-
its in Nangarhar.117 ISIL now controls just a few 
districts in Nangarhar and no longer seems to sys-
tematically interfere with drug production, although 
they still may do so in individual cases.
Looking beyond entities on which the Security 
Council has imposed sanctions, individual United 
Nations Member States and non-governmental 
organizations identify several additional organiza-
tions as either terrorists, insurgents or non-State 
armed groups.
The most substantial evidence linking such groups 
to drug trafficking comes from Colombia, where 
they began to play a direct role in the drug trade in 
the 1980s and gained importance in the 1990s. They 
provided security for coca crops, and taxed the intro-
duction of precursor chemicals and the use of 
landing strips.118 FARC in particular played a prom-
inent role in taxing different aspects of the 
production chain and in selling coca paste, and later 
became involved in the cocaine trade to neighbour-
ing countries.119, 120
In neighbouring Peru, the Shining Path (Sendero 
Luminoso) used the profits from cocaine processing 
116 MCN and UNODC, Afghan Opium Survey 2016 – Culti-
vation and Production (Vienna, 2016). 
117 United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 18 August 
2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to 
the President of the Security Council”, 26 August 2015. 
118 Arlene Beth Tickner, Diego García and Catalina Arreaza, 
“Actores violentos no estatales y narcotráfico en Colombia”, 
Politica Antidrogas en Colombia: Exitos, fracasos y extravios 
(Bogotá, 2011).
119 Richard Snyder and Angelica Duran-Martinez, "Does ille-
gality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored 
protection rackets." Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 52, 
No. 3 (Springer, 2009), pp. 253-273.
120 M. Romero, “Paramilitares y autodefensas 1982-2003”, 
Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Bogotá, 2003).
emerged so far. ISIL fighters111 as well as those of 
other groups involved in the civil war in the Syrian 
Arab Republic have also been reported to consume 
“captagon”.112, 113 
Based mainly in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, 
Boko Haram has reportedly helped drug traffickers 
to smuggle heroin and cocaine across the subre-
gion.114 Further links between the group and the 
drug trade were revealed during a court case in 
Chad. In its judgment of 28 August 2015 in the 
trial of 10 alleged Boko Haram members, the 
N’djamena court of appeals heard that considerable 
quantities of psychotropic substances had been 
recovered during the search of the home of one of 
the Boko Haram defendants. The court concluded 
that Boko Haram members were regularly involved 
in the trafficking in and consumption of those 
substances.115
While drug markets and terrorist groups may in 
some cases go hand in hand, there have been exam-
ples of terrorist groups whose influence led to 
reductions in drug cultivation, at least temporarily. 
The Taliban’s opium poppy ban in 2001 led to a 
drastic reduction in cultivation in Afghanistan, 
though they did not maintain this policy and in 
subsequent years actively participated again in the 
flourishing drug sector.
111 Max Kravitz and Will Nichol, “A bitter pill to swallow: con-
nections between captagon, Syria and The Gulf”, Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 69, No. 2 (18 May 2016).
112 Lukasz Kamieński, Shooting up: A Short History of Drugs 
and War (New York, Oxford University Press, 2016); 
Zeinab Abul-Magd and Elke Grawert, Businessmen in Arms: 
How the Military and other Armed Groups Profit in the 
MENA Region (New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); 
Vijay Prashad, The Death of the Nation and the Future of the 
Arab Revolution (University of California Press, Oakland, 
California, 2016); Solomon Hussein, Islamic State and 
the Coming Global Confrontation, University of the Free 
State (Palgrave Macmillan, Bloemfontain, 2016); Robert J. 
Bunker, Blood Sacrifices: Violent Non-State Actors and Dark 
Magico-Religious Activities, A Terrorism Research Center 
Book (Bloomington, 2016). 
113 Kravitz and Nichol, “A bitter pill to swallow: connections 
between captagon, Syria and the Gulf”. 
114 South Front, “Video: arms and drug trafficking in Africa. 
The role of Boko Haram”, Centre for Research on Globali-
zation (14 March 2016). Available at www.globalresearch.
ca/video-arms-and-drug-trafficking-in-africa-the-role-of-
boko-haram/5514293.
115 Judgment of 28 August 2015 by the N’djamena (Chad) 
court of appeals.
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Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1988 (2011) estimated the overall annual 
income of the Taliban from all sources at around 
$400 million,126 half of which was likely to have 
been derived from the illicit narcotics economy.127
In Colombia, FARC seems to have been heavily 
reliant on coca/cocaine-related income, particularly 
at the turn of the new millennium. Despite a drop 
in revenue as the Colombian coca/cocaine sector 
started shrinking, drug-related income appears to 
have remained an important source of income in 
subsequent years as well. As an outcome of the peace 
process and the Peace Agreement signed in 2016, 
there is now agreement that FARC is to halt its 
involvement in the drug business as it turns into a 
legal political force.
Estimates of the income generated by the illicit drug 
trade need to be considered from the perspective of 
the overall income of terrorist, insurgent and other 
non-State armed groups, for which there is very little 
authoritative information. For example, Forbes 
International attempted to value the world�s 10 
richest terrorist and other groups, with an estimated 
total combined income of $4.9 billion in 2014. The 
reported income distribution, however, appears to 
have been highly skewed, ranging from $25 million 
to $2 billion among the 10 richest organisations.128 
More than half of the income was attributed to 
groups officially recognized by the United Nations 
as terrorist organizations (ISIL, Taliban, Al-Qaida, 
Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram).129 ISIL was esti-
mated to be the richest terrorist group in 2014, with 
a turnover of roughly $2 billion. However, ISIL 
suffered territorial losses and therefore obtained 
lower tax income and revenue from oil and less 
potential for looting and confiscations. As a result, 
126 First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions  
Implementation Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to 
resolution 1988 (2011) concerning the Taliban and associ-
ated individuals and entities (S/2012/683), para. 34.
127 S/2016/842, para. 15. 
128 Forbes International, “The world’s 10 richest terrorist 
organizations” (12 December 2014). Available at https://
www.forbes.com.
129 Taking estimates of the “richest” terrorist/insurgency groups 
as a basis (derived from interviews with representatives of 
the intelligence community, security experts, counter-terror 
specialists as well as reports and analyses from international 
non-governmental organizations, academic and government 
organizations and think tanks).
plants to fund its activities over four decades.121 
The group was particularly active in the 1990s.
Insurgent groups and rebel armies operating in east-
ern Myanmar, notably in Shan state, have reportedly 
been involved in the heroin trade for the past six 
decades122 and in methamphetamine manufactur-
ing and trafficking for the past two decades.123 
Elsewhere in the world, the evidence supporting 
links between terrorist, insurgent and non-State 
armed groups and the illicit drug trade is less 
rigorous. 
Funding of terrorist, insurgent and 
non-State armed groups
Data on the funding of terrorist, insurgent and non-
State armed groups is incomplete, with estimates 
varying widely; all aggregations must be treated with 
caution. However, such figures can give some likely 
orders of magnitude. 
UNODC estimated that terrorist and insurgent 
groups raised about $150 million in 2016 from the 
Afghan opiate trade in taxes levied on the cultivation 
of opium poppy and trafficking of opiates.124 Their 
overall drug-related income, however, may be higher. 
The Consolidated Security Council Sanctions List 
features a number of Taliban leaders who are accused 
not only of taxing the drug business, but also of 
direct involvement in trafficking.125 The Security 
121 Mirella von Dun, Cocaleros – Violence, Drugs and Social 
Mobilization in the Post-Conflict Upper Huallaga Valley, Peru 
(Amsterdam, 2009); Francisco E. Thoumi, Debates y Para-
digmas de las Políticas de Drogas en el Mundo y los Desafiós 
para Colombia (Bogotá, Academia Colombiana de Ciencias, 
2015), pp. 448-449; Patricik L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. 
Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (Palgrave Macmillan 
US, 1998) pp. 180-183. 
122 Letizia Paoli, Victoria A. Greenfield and Peter Reuter,  
The World Heroin Market: Can Supply Be Cut? (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2009); Howard Abadinsky, Organ-
ized Crime 11 ed. (Boston, Cengage Learning, 2016).
123 Pierre-Arnau Chouvy and Joël Meissonier, Yaa Baa: Pro-
duction, Traffic and Consumption of Methamphetamine in 
Mainland Southeast Asia (Singapore University Press, 2004); 
Abadinsky, Organized Crime. 
124 Sustainable Development in an Opium Production Environ-
ment – Afghanistan Opium Survey Report 2016.
125 The list, in addition, contains companies with close links 
to the Taliban and the drug business, including trading 
companies, money exchanges and hawala (money transfer) 
companies that support Taliban military operations and the 
drug trade in Afghanistan. 
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with opium poppy cultivation; however, it is only 
since 2010 that high and increasing levels of opium 
cultivation have shown a closer correlation with 
rising terrorist attacks. The reasons for this are com-
plex, but armed groups have found it increasingly 
difficult to access “traditional” funding sources, 
which may have resulted in a stronger reliance on 
“alternative” financing such as drug trafficking. 
The post-2010 rise in violence is also linked to a 
number of other factors, including the withdrawal 
of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
forces and subsequent disbanding of provincial 
reconstruction teams, the emergence of destabiliz-
ing groups opposing the peace process, and the 
expansion of the illicit economy into new areas such 
as the illegal exploitation of natural resources, which 
has led to the emergence of new insurgent groups. 
More broadly, the areas under opium poppy culti-
vation in Afghanistan are, to varying degrees, 
controlled by diverse terrorist, insurgent and other 
armed groups, including the Taliban. Between 26 
per cent and 85 per cent of the area under opium 
poppy cultivation is estimated to be under varying 
degrees of Taliban influence.
the group’s income had reportedly declined by more 
than half by 2016,130 although it is likely that their 
expenses also declined sharply as they were no longer 
in control of as many cities and villages as before.
Drugs and terror attacks
Some 170,000 people lost their lives in terror attacks 
between 2000 and 2015, including 30,000 in 2015 
alone, according to the Global Terrorism Database,131 
the largest systematic collection of open-source 
information on terrorism acts worldwide. The data-
base, which has information on 163 countries going 
back to 1970, uses the umbrella term “terrorism” to 
cover attacks by terrorists, non-State armed groups, 
rebels and insurgents.
In some cases, there is a positive correlation between 
terror attacks, as defined by the Global Terrorism 
Database, and the world’s most intensive areas of 
drug manufacturing and trafficking as reported in 
2015. Some of those areas see a significant number 
of terrorist incidents. However, a correlation does 
not necessarily point to a causal link. Some areas 
where the drug trade is intensive are not significantly 
affected by terrorism, and vice versa.
Opium poppy cultivation and insurgency 
in Afghanistan
Afghanistan, accounting for close to 13 per cent of 
all terrorism-related deaths worldwide between 2000 
and 2015, gives a great insight into the potential 
link between drug production and terrorism.132 
The Taliban was responsible for 73 per cent of all 
terrorism-related deaths in Afghanistan during the 
period 2000-2015, and 84 per cent of such deaths 
in 2015. This was followed by ISIL, which accounted 
for 4 per cent of the total in 2015.133 
High levels of insecurity in Afghanistan have been 
related to a range of events: conflict, disputes and 
terrorist activities. They have also been associated 
130 Stefan Heissner and others, “Caliphate in decline: an esti-
mate of Islamic State’s financial fortunes” (London, The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 
Political Violence, 2017). Available at http://icsr.info. 
131 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Data-
base (June 2016). Available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
Fig. 5 Persons killed in terrorist attacks and 
area under opium poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan, 2000-2016
Source: MCN and UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016 
- Cultivation and Production (Vienna, 2016), and previous years; 
Global Terrorism Database.
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situation in the north of the country coincided with 
an increase in opium poppy cultivation. Clearly, a 
lack of government control is conducive to the 
expansion and persistence of opium poppy 
cultivation.134 
134 Sustainable Development in an Opium Production Environ-
ment – Afghanistan Opium Survey Report 2016.
A socioeconomic survey conducted in Afghanistan 
in 2016 revealed that villages with opium poppy 
cultivation are more likely to be under the influence 
of anti-government groups (61 per cent) than 
villages without opium poppy cultivation. Moreover, 
it was found that the increased influence of 
insurgency groups and a deterioration in the security 
Map 1 Area under control of insurgent groups and area under opium poppy cultivation in  
Afghanistan, 2016
Source: MCN and UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016 – Cultivation and Production (Vienna, 2016). Insurgency groups 
taken from the Institute for the Study of War, November 2016.
Note: the boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsment or acceptance by the 
United Nations. Dashed lines represents undetermined boudaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and 
Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. 
The insurgency groups are mapped with different classes of confidence, which have been merged for the purpose of this map. Geographic 
projection: WGS 84.
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Insurgency groups and opium poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan, 2016
Level of opium cultivation per district
very low
low
moderate
high
very high
Insurgency groups
Taliban control zone
Taliban support zone
ISIL  support zone
Table 7 Distribution of opium poppy cultivation areas according to variations in level of control 
by insurgent groups, Afghanistan, 2016
Source: MCN and UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016 – Cultivation and Production (Vienna, 2016); Government of 
Afghanistan. Insurgency groups taken from the Institute for the Study of War, November 2016.
Opium 
poppy  
cultivation 
2016 
Opium 
poppy in 
Taliban  
control 
zone 
Opium poppy  
in High-  
confidence 
Taliban 
support zone
Opium poppy 
in Low-  
confidence 
Taliban  
support zone
Opium 
poppy 
in three  
Taliban 
support 
zones
Opium 
poppy 
in High-  
confidence 
ISIL support 
zone
Opium 
poppy  
in Low-  
confidence 
ISIS support 
zone
Opium 
poppy  
in other 
areas 
Area (ha) 201,294 52,642 116,135 2,490  171,267 2,229 623 43,400
Proportion 100% 26% 58% 1% 85% 1.1% 0.3% 13%
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Drug cultivation and terrorist, insurgent 
and non-State armed groups in Peru, 
Colombia and Myanmar
Examples in Peru, Colombia and Myanmar show 
the complex relationship between drug cultivation 
and the activities of terrorist, insurgent and non-
State armed groups. While a causal relationship 
cannot be established, reductions in drug cultivation 
can go in parallel with lower levels of activity by 
such groups; and lower levels of insurgent activities 
can help to strengthen the application of the rule of 
law by the authorities and thus contribute to a 
reduction in illicit drug cultivation. 
In Peru, the area under coca cultivation shrank by 
nearly 70 per cent from its peak in 1992 to 2015.135 
During the same period, the number of people killed 
by terrorist, insurgent and non-State armed groups 
fell from 818 in 1992 to six in 2015; most of those 
135 World Drug Report 2016 and previous years. 
Fig. 6 Government control of villages, by 
poppy-cultivation status, Afghanistan, 
2016
Source: UNODC and MCN, Sustainable Development in an 
Opium Production Environment – Afghanistan Opium Survey 
Report 2016 (Vienna, 2017).
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Fig. 7 Attacks by terrorist, insurgent and non-State armed groups and area under coca 
cultivation, Peru, 1978-2016
Sources: UNODC and Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas (DEVIDA), Perú Monitorea de Cultivos de Coca 2015 
(July 2016 and previous years); DEVIDA, Información sobre Drogas Estadística en el Perú, Lima (July 2006); Policía Nacional del 
Perú, Anuario Estadístico 2015 (2015 and previous years); Policía Nacional del Perú, Direccíon Contra el Terrorismo, Anuario 
Estadístico 2009; Hernán Manrique López, “Las bases históricas del milagro de San Martin: control territorial y estrategias 
estatales contra el narcotráfico y subversión (198-1995)”, Politai: Revista de Ciencia Política, vol. 6, No. 11 (2015), pp. 33-51; 
Juan Briceño and Javier Martínez, “El ciclo operativo del tráfico ilícito de la coca y sus derivados: implicancias en la liquidez del 
sistema financiero”, F. León, y R. Castro de Mata, eds., Pasta básica de cocaína (Lima, 1989), pp. 263-264; Ibán De Rementería, 
“Evolution of coca leaf production in Peru and its macroeconomic role between 1978 y 1990”, Peru Report, April 1991.
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Terror tactics and drug money
Evidence on the links between drugs, terrorism and 
insurgency is patchy, focuses on a small number of 
groups, or builds on sources with an interest in empha-
sizing or diminishing those links. Most information 
on terrorism is collected by intelligence agencies and 
fatalities were the result of operations by the Shin-
ing Path, which was behind 772 deaths in 1992, 
but just three in 2015.136 Most operations by the 
Shining Path took place in, or close to, the Alto 
Huallaga region, which used to be the main coca 
cultivation area in Peru. This is also illustrated by 
the number of attacks and casualties suffered by the 
personnel of Proyecto Especial de Control de Cultivos 
de Coca (CORAH). Between 2005 and 2012 there 
were around 30 attacks, with 133 injuries and 11 
deaths of CORAH personnel. The number of 
attacks by terrorist, insurgent and non-State armed 
groups over the past three decades shows a positive 
correlation with the area under coca cultivation in 
the Alto Huallaga region, with declines in coca cul-
tivation since the early 1990s going hand in hand 
with declines in attacks.
Similarly, in Colombia the area under coca cultiva-
tion shrank by 70 per cent between 2000 and 2013 
during a decline in the number of operations by 
FARC.137 The number of victims of violence by 
non-State armed groups also showed a marked 
decline over the same period.138 The number of 
people killed by non-State armed groups fell from 
426 in 2000 to 137 in 2013; among them, the 
number killed by FARC declined by almost 60 per 
cent, from 256 in 2000 to 106 in 2013.139 How-
ever, the apparent connection between coca 
cultivation and violence has become less straight-
forward in recent years. Cultivation doubled 
between 2013 and 2015 even as FARC-related kill-
ings declined further, by more than half. 
In Myanmar, there is a weaker correlation between 
the activities of various non-State armed groups and 
insurgents and the area under opium poppy culti-
vation.140 The number of people killed in terror 
attacks fell from 86 in 1996 to zero in 2006. They 
rose again to 58 by 2015,141 when the area under 
opium poppy cultivation had tripled.
136 Global Terrorism Database.
137 World Drug Report 2016 and previous years. 
138 Unidad para la Atención y Preparación Integral a las Víc-
timas, Red Nacíonal de Información, "Registro único de 
víctimas" (1 April 2017). Available at http://rni.unidadvicti-
mas.gov.co/RUV.
139 Global Terrorism Database.
140 World Drug Report 2016 and previous years. 
141 Global Terrorism Database. 
Fig. 8 Registered victims* of non-State armed  
violence and area under coca cultivation,  
Colombia, 2000-2016
* Victims of terrorist attacks, related homicides, mines, kidnapping, forced  
displacements, forced disappearance, torture, etc.
Sources: UNODC and Gobierno de Colombia, Colombia Monitoreo de  
territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2015 (July 2016 and previous 
years); Unidad para la Atención y Peparación Integral a las Víctimas, Red 
Nacíonal de Información, "Registro único de víctimas". Available at 
http://rni.unidadvictimas.gov.co/RUV.
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area under opium poppy cultivation, Myanmar, 
1996-2015
Sources: UNODC, Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015 (Vienna, 2016), 
and previous years; Global Terrorism Database. 
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is classified. Open-source information largely comes 
from media reports and studies by non-governmen-
tal organizations and think tanks. Governments 
rarely release detailed information to the public.
Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some tentative 
conclusions. In general, income linked to the drug 
sector is only one of several revenue streams for ter-
rorist groups. If one revenue stream dries up, another 
can be tapped, such as extortion, kidnapping for 
ransom, bank robberies, sale of natural resources or 
sale of cultural artefacts.142 As a result, reducing 
drug production and drug trafficking may not be 
sufficient to effectively squeeze the financial 
resources of terrorist and other non-State armed 
groups and insurgents. At the same time, there is 
evidence that drug production and the activities of 
some of these groups may go hand in hand in some 
areas.
Their level of dependence on the drug trade — 
whether taxing farmers, protecting routes and trade, 
or direct involvement in production and trafficking 
— will be determined by their size, structure, ideol-
ogy, location and existence of alternative financial 
sources. The prominence of drugs in financing will 
thus vary strongly from one group to another. 
Insurgents aiming to control large amounts of ter-
ritory are likely to need large financial resources, 
and involvement in organized crime activities, such 
as the drug business, may at least partly cover those 
funding needs. Yet much will depend on their strat-
egy. A pointed attack focused on maximising media 
exposure and creating fear and intimidation does 
not necessarily need large or sustained funding. In 
fact, channelling smaller amounts of money through 
operations of that nature can reduce the risk of 
detection. Besides, there will always be a large 
number of “soft targets” for such an attack, which 
can easily be exploited by terrorists with or without 
drug money.
142 S/2015/366. 
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GLOSSARY
amphetamine-type stimulants — a group of sub-
stances composed of synthetic stimulants that were 
placed under international control in the Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and are 
from the group of substances called amphetamines, 
which includes amphetamine, methamphetamine, 
methcathinone and the “ecstasy”-group substances 
(3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) 
and its analogues).
amphetamines — a group of amphetamine-type 
stimulants that includes amphetamine and 
methamphetamine.
coca paste (or coca base) — an extract of the leaves 
of the coca bush. Purification of coca paste yields 
cocaine (base and hydrochloride).
“crack” cocaine — cocaine base obtained from 
cocaine hydrochloride through conversion processes 
to make it suitable for smoking.
cocaine salt — cocaine hydrochloride.
new psychoactive substances — substances of abuse, 
either in a pure form or a preparation, that are not 
controlled under the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961 or the 1971 Convention, but that 
may pose a public health threat. In this context, the 
term “new” does not necessarily refer to new inven-
tions but to substances that have recently become 
available.
opiates — a subset of opioids comprising the various 
products derived from the opium poppy plant, 
including opium, morphine and heroin.
opioids — a generic term applied to alkaloids from 
opium poppy (opiates), their synthetic analogues 
(mainly prescription or pharmaceutical opioids) and 
compounds synthesized in the body.
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REGIONAL GROUPINGS 
• Central Asia and Transcaucasia: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
• East and South-East Asia: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, China, Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Japan, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and 
Viet Nam 
• South-West Asia: Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic 
Republic of ) and Pakistan 
• Near and Middle East: Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen
• South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka 
• Eastern Europe: Belarus, Republic of Moldova, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine
• South-Eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia and Turkey
• Western and Central Europe: Andorra, Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San 
Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland
• Oceania: Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of ), 
Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and small island territories
The World Drug Report uses a number of regional 
and subregional designations. These are not official 
designations, and are defined as follows:
• East Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania 
• North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia
• Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe
• West and Central Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and Togo 
• Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Bermuda, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and 
Tobago
• Central America: Belize, Costa Rica,  
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Panama
• North America: Canada, Mexico and United 
States of America 
• South America: Argentina, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of ), Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of )
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To celebrate 20 years since its inception, the World Drug 
Report 2017 is presented in a new five-booklet format 
designed to improve reader friendliness while maintaining the 
wealth of information contained within. 
Booklet 1 summarizes the content of the four subsequent 
substantive booklets and presents policy implications drawn 
from their findings. Booklet 2 deals with the supply, use and 
health consequences of drugs. Booklet 3 focuses on the 
cultivation, production and consumption of the three 
plant-based drugs (cocaine, opiates and cannabis) and on the 
impact of new cannabis policies. Booklet 4 provides an 
extended analysis of the global synthetic drugs market and 
contains the bulk of the analysis for the triennial global 
synthetic drugs assessment. Finally, Booklet 5 contains a 
discussion on the nexus between the drug problem, organized 
crime, illicit financial flows, corruption and terrorism.
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as ever, aimed at improving the understanding of the world 
drug problem and contributing towards fostering greater 
international cooperation for countering its impact on health 
and security.
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